Forcing these people to relocate hours away from their jobs and former homes was not only the Burmese form of gerrymandering, but it set a clear precedent for anyone who doubted the regime at the time (Erlanger, 1990). This was a clear example of one of the numerous ways the Tatmadaw clenched its iron fist in a clever and manipulative fashion in order to guarantee a particular desired result at the expense of the Bamar Buddhist population it insists it has always protected. Despite the SLORC regime’s efforts, the 1990 elections brought about a 70% win for the NLD. Nevertheless, the SLORC deemed the results illegitimate, and power was secured for the Tatmadaw and the new SLORC for decades to come. In Arakan at this time, an increased military presence and knowledge of the protests in the central part of the country drove the general population to follow suit, and the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) was born. It is important to stipulate that although the ALD was a proponent of democracy, it explicitly excluded the Rohingya. It was soon apparent that the abusive tactics used during the BSPP’s reign would persist under the SLORC regime. An example of this was the 1991–1992 Operation Pyi Thaya (Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation). The Tatmadaw’s explanation for the mission was similar to that of Operation Nagamin. The SLORC claimed that it was responding to the military expansion of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, a political group formed as a direct result of Nagamin. The operation resulted in a second mass exodus of Rohingya civilians, with sources again estimating that some 250,000 people were forced to flee to Bangladesh. This time, Tatmadaw forces crossed the Bangladesh border following refugees—and action that shook the foundation of the two countries’ relations indefinitely. 15

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