workers exploited at the scam centres are lured to Myanmar from China, Thailand and other Asian countries with false promises. The same applies to their victims, many of whom come from neighbouring countries, too. Moreover, according to the UN, Myanmar is the world’s largest producer of illegal opium and one of the largest manufacturers of crystal meth in the world. China and Southeast Asia are among the main transit and sales markets for drugs from Myanmar. In the effort to secure their own external borders, neighbouring countries have focused on combating crossborder crime that originates in Myanmar. That is why they are interested in ongoing cooperation with Myanmar, not least for the purpose of law enforcement and for the repatriation of their own citizens. More specifically, they are interested in cooperating with both the EAOs and the state security forces. Third, there are strategic reasons for further normalising bilateral relations. For Beijing, in particular, Myanmar serves as a strategic corridor to increase its own security of supply in the event of a crisis. China has financed transport routes as well as oil and gas pipelines between Myanmar’s Rakhine State, which stretches along the Bay of Bengal, and the Chinese province of Yunnan. In this way, Beijing is attempting to secure direct access to the Indian Ocean without having to pass through the Strait of Malacca, which could easily be blocked by the US and its allies (China’s so-called “Malacca dilemma”). In addition, Myanmar is considered a strategic buffer against US influence in mainland Southeast Asia. India, for its part, sees a potentially China-dominated Myanmar on its “eastern flank” as a strategic challenge. Closer relations with Myanmar are intended to prevent the country from being “lost” to China. And planned east-west economic corridors are intended to link India’s eastern states more closely with mainland Southeast Asia. Prospects for international cooperation For all the reasons identified above, Myanmar’s neighbours will – directly or indirectly – recognise its “civilian” government and begin to normalise relations with the country, regardless of the political and economic instability that persists there even after the recent elections. It remains to be seen to what extent Washington, which has been critical of the sham elections, will aim to normalise relations with Myanmar. Some steps taken by the Trump administration point to normalisation, most notably the recent lifting of sanctions against businesspeople close to the junta and the military-linked companies belonging to them. Such moves are to be seen in the context of reports that the Trump administration is exploring ways to gain access to Myanmar’s rare earths in order to limit the access of China – the United States’ main strategic rival – to those resources. However, Germany and the EU should continue to reject outright any normalisation of relations with Myanmar and refrain from recognising the new “civilian” government – for three reasons. First, it is very unlikely that the sham election will do much to resolve Myanmar’s “polycrisis”. The actors responsible for this crisis, who have been actively involved in turning parts of the country into a global centre of organised crime, simply want to swap their military uniforms for civilian clothes without ushering in any significant political, economic or social change. Second, given the deliberate exclusion of any opposition groups from the elections, it is almost inconceivable that, in the medium term, there could be a more inclusive form of government (democratic or otherwise) that could bring about (genuine) political stabilisation in the country. Third, political and geographical factors make it impossible for Europe to play a significant role in the competition for Myanmar’s rare earths. Europe does not have the close political ties either to the junta or to SWP Comment 9 February 2026 5