It is for these reasons that the UN describes the state of affairs in Myanmar as a “polycrisis” – in reference both to the humanitarian disaster and to the political and economic situation in the country. That crisis is also having an impact on the diverse interests of neighbouring countries. Against this backdrop, the military will have to overcome formidable challenges if it is to keep its promise to “return” to constitutional political order through the recent elections. A durable stabilisation cannot be expected at present. The elections and their political significance For such a “return”, including the reinstatement of the bicameral parliament, it would have been necessary to hold the elections nationwide. However, that was far from being the case owing to the civil war. Even before the ballot, the junta had been forced to admit publicly that voting would take place in just 265 of the 330 townships (the third administrative tier of Myanmar’s governance structure, below that of the states and districts). However, it does not fully control all of those 265 townships. In addition, millions of people have been displaced; and, despite amnesties, tens of thousands remain in prison and were therefore unable to participate in the elections. In the run-up to election day, more than 50 political parties – including the NLD – were barred from participating. Combined, those parties had won more than 90 per cent of the seats in the last free elections, which took place in 2020. As a result of their exclusion in 2025, it was only representatives of the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) who ran for election in several dozen townships. Aung San Suu Kyi and other leading opposition politicians remained or remain in detention, under house arrest or in exile. Thus, even before the elections, it looked certain that the military-backed USDP would win. The voting took place in three phases between the end of December 2025 and the end of January 2026. After the elections, the USDP declared itself the winner; according to the official final results, it won 72 per cent of the vote (compared with just 6 per cent in 2020). Voter turnout was officially reported at just over 50 per cent, even though pressure had been exerted on the population to vote. Any criticism of the legitimacy and credibility of the elections was rejected by the junta. More than 200 election critics, including opposition politicians, journalists and artists, were detained during the election campaign under the new “Election Protection Act”. Even social media posts expressing criticism of the elections could lead to an arrest. The “successful” conduct of the elections is unlikely to increase the legitimacy of either the coup carried out under the military leadership of Min Aung Hlaing or the elected “civilian” government in Myanmar. In terms of both personnel and ideology, the latter will have very close ties to the current military leaders, especially since Min Aung Hlaing has filled many top positions in the with retired military figures and the constitution stipulates that 25 per cent of parliamentary seats are to be reserved for active military personnel. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the majority of the population is unlikely to regard the new government as legitimate. Moreover, the fact that military operations continued during the election campaign – in particular, villages and towns were bombed, claiming many civilian casualties – will not have gone unnoticed. Domestically, the new Myanmar government is likely to face an opposition that is heterogeneous but united in its rejection of both the elections and the new government. Nevertheless, the way has been paved for a transition from a military junta widely criticized internationally and sanctioned by some countries to a “civilian” government that has been formed on the basis of the recent (sham) elections. The hope of some neighbouring states, including Thailand, that a reform process similar to the one that followed the 2010 elections can now be SWP Comment 9 February 2026 3

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