Myanmar: Digital Content Regulation interests is unduly restrictive. Such a rule might, for example, be used to prevent reporting on crime or terrorist attacks on the grounds that it might encourage terrorism. In their 2008 Joint Declaration on Defamation of Religions, and AntiTerrorism and Anti-Extremism Legislation, the special international mandates on freedom of expression stated: “The public has a right to know about the perpetration of acts of terrorism, or attempts thereat, and the media should not be penalised for providing such information.”15 Furthermore, sections 33(a) and (b) go beyond just protecting national security and public order to also protect a number of interests – including ‘national solidarity’, ‘national economy, ‘national culture’, and ‘community peace and tranquillity’ – that are not recognised as legitimate grounds for restricting freedom of expression in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. While we might hope that citizens would support these values, the right to freedom of expression applies not only to speech which is popularly welcomed but also to information and ideas which “offend, shock or disturb the State or any other sector of the population.”16 Section 38 extends these prohibitions to anyone who conspires in or abets the commission of an offence. This potentially extends liability to, for example, the operator of a social network which disseminated prohibited statements or even telecommunications companies whose infrastructure facilitated their distribution. Of course it is unlikely that this was the intention of those who drafted the Law or that authorities would enforce it in this manner. However, the potential for significantly overbroad application of this rule remains problematical. Section 33(b) deals with the receiving, sending or distributing of State secrets (as noted above, defined unduly broadly). Subject to certain protections (see below), it is legitimate to impose penalties on officials who leak genuinely secret information which they received due to their official functions. However, secrecy laws which criminalise the mere receipt of information raise serious freedom of expression concerns. On the one hand, the fluid flow of information through digital technologies means that almost anyone could be the innocent recipient of secret information, and they should certainly not be penalised for this. On the other hand, it is legitimate for journalists not only to receive but also to further disseminate leaks, and this serves an important function in ensuring that information of public interest reaches the public. As the special international mandates on freedom of expression stated in their 2004 Joint Declaration: Public authorities and their staff bear sole responsibility for protecting the confidentiality of legitimately secret information under their control. Other individuals, including journalists and civil society representatives, should never be subject to liability for publishing or further disseminating this information, regardless of whether or not it has been leaked to them, unless they committed fraud or another crime to obtain the information.17 10 December 2008. Available at: http://www.osce.org/fom/66176. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, Application No. 5493/72, para. 49 (European Court of Human Rights). 17 6 December 2004. Available at: http://www.osce.org/fom/66176. 15 16 -7-