Myanmar: Digital Content Regulation These provisions are particularly problematical in the digital communications environment, given the rapid nature of communications interactions. A perhaps trite example of participating in the dissemination of incorrect information is the action of clicking the “I have read and understood these terms” button that we all do from time to time, given the large number of terms of service agreements which require users to certify that they have read and understood them, implying informed consent. The vast majority of users click these buttons without having read the terms, thereby formally disseminating incorrect information. As a result, this provision would criminalise virtually everybody who has used the Internet. Section 69 prohibits the disclosure of encrypted information to any “irrelevant person” unless authorised to do so by a court, which can attract a penalty of imprisonment for up to one year. Once again, this is far too broad and fails to contain any defences or limitations. Many people now routinely use encryption to protect their communications, and it is also common for the recipients of that information to pass it on to third parties, which would be rendered criminal by this provision (since it is not limited to official systems of encryption). Indeed, strictly speaking pursuant to this provision, even the originator of an encrypted communication could not authorise its being passed on to a third party, since this power vests only in a court. In any case, rules like this on secrecy of information are legitimate only if they are restricted to information which is genuinely sensitive, whereas this applies whenever information is (merely) encrypted, which is not at all the same thing. Section 73 of Telecommunications Law applies the same penalty for all of these offences to anyone who abets in their commission so that, like the Electronic Transactions Law, it potentially extends liability to virtually every Internet service provider and social media platform. Section 75 grants the government vast powers to obtain telecommunications information from private service providers, stating: The Union Government may, as may be necessary, direct to the relevant organization for enabling to obtain any information and telecommunications which causes harm to national security and prevalence of law without affecting the fundamental rights of the citizens. This provision is highly problematical for a number of reasons. First, the terms “as may be necessary” and “harm to national security” are undefined and hence potentially too broad, and so should be narrowed. As noted above, in relation to the Official Secrets Act, while national security may justify some restrictions on freedom of expression, it needs to be defined carefully in order to comply with international human rights law. In the absence of any specific constraints, this provision effectively grants the government broad powers to compel telecommunications companies to conduct potentially intrusive surveillance and even to police and control user content. The potential danger of this was noted in the 2011 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression: - 14 -