BSR | Human Rights Impact Assessment: Facebook in Myanmar 13 percent from January 2017.25 The call and messaging app Viber is also very popular, with approximately 25 million users in 2016.26 WeChat is used in Shan State, which borders China. Myanmar’s telecommunications infrastructure is largely controlled by the Ministry of Transport and Communications’ (MoTC) Post and Telecommunications Department, via the state-owned telecommunications provider, Myanmar Post Telecommunication (MPT). The MoTC is also responsible for information technology and cybersecurity, and is in the process of establishing a Social Media Monitoring Unit, reportedly to monitor overseas interference in Myanmar’s social media activity.27 The MoTC’s designated department for this effort, the IT and Security Department, did not provide any further details of this initiative to BSR. A separate Cybercrime Division within the Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible for Myanmar’s approach to cybercrime and related legislation, such as the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law.28 There are equal numbers of internet users and Facebook users in Myanmar. As a result, many people use Facebook as their main source of information, and government municipalities, departments, officials, and leaders have Facebook pages, even if they do not have a webpage. Facebook has been described as having a powerful democratizing effect in Myanmar by exposing millions of people to concepts like democracy and human rights, increasing accountability for lawmakers and enforcers, and providing a communications channel for political representatives and their constituents. It also provides a learning platform for human rights activists, which improves civic participation and empowers civil society. Despite transitioning from a military to a nominally civilian government in recent years, internet activity continues to be monitored in Myanmar. Government takedown requests for content are not common, but they are increasing, and at least 61 people were prosecuted for online speech from June 2016 to May 2017.29 Telecommunications providers Telenor Myanmar and Ooredoo Myanmar reported receiving 85 requests for information in early 2016, and Facebook received one request for user data between July and December 2016.30 Consequently, online self-censorship is common, with many individuals and journalists being cautious about what they post or report on with regard to the military and the NLD government. Digital literacy is generally low across the country, and many people find it difficult to verify or differentiate content (for example, real news from misinformation). Many influential individuals, including teachers, politicians, religious leaders, celebrities, and local government representatives use Facebook to make posts on race; religion; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) issues; and other topics. Facebook is also used to spread rumors about people and events. Character assassinations were described to BSR during this assessment, and in extreme cases these have extended to online death threats and the public disclosure of private information like home addresses and ID cards. There are indications that organized groups make use of multiple fake accounts and news pages to spread hate speech, fake news, and misinformation for political gain. Rumors spread on social media have been associated with communal violence and mob justice.31 25 We Are Social, 2018. Partners Asia, 2017. 27 Myanmar Times, 2018. 28 Part 14-A of law states that “irrespective of any existing law, the responsible person of any telecommunications service provider shall, upon receipt of the order from the Central Board concerning records containing information related to the crime, allow inspection and copying of records related to the crime.” 29 Freedom House, 2017. 30 Ibid. 31 PRI, 2014. 26