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75 KTZH (2023), 'Myanmar's active participation in China-ASEAN Information Harbour process,' Global New Light of Myanmar website, 10 November, [accessed online], https://www.gnlm.com.mm/myanmars-active-participation-in-china-asean-information-harbour-process/ 76 Global Technology Company Limited, 'About Us,' GlobalNet Myanmar website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https:// www.globalnet.com.mm/about-us/ 77 Global Technology Company Limited, ‘Solution,' GlobalNet Myanmar website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https:// www.globalnet.com.mm/solutions/ 78 Global Technology Company Limited, 'Industries,' GlobalNet Myanmar website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https:// www.globalnet.com.mm/industries/ 79 Justice For Myanmar (2020), ‘Nodes of Corruption, Lines of Abuse,' op. cit. 80 'What is dark fiber?' Spectrum Enterprise website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https://enterprise.spectrum.com/support/ faq/internet/what-is-dark-fiber.html 81 'IGW Services,' MTN PCL website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https://mtnpcl.com/igw-services/ 82 'Fiber Services,' MTN PCL website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https://mtnpcl.com/fiber-services/ 83 'MTN Profile,' MTN PCL website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https://mtnpcl.com/mtn-profile/ ; 'Asia,' WebSat Media website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https://www.websatmedia.com/coverage/asia 84 Khin Moh Moh Lwin and Thaw Zin Myo (2020), 'The PPP, a party of NLD defectors, military men and ultranationalists,' Myanmar Now website, 4 November, [accessed online], https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/the-ppp-a-party-of-nld-defectors-military-men-andultranationalists/ 85 Internet Maekhong, ‘Our Services,' Internet Maekhong website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https:// www.internetmaekhong.com/ 86 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2011), ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework,’ [accessed online], OHCHR website, https://www.ohchr.org/ sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf 87 Ibid. 88 Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar (2025), ‘Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar,’ OHCHR website, 29 August, [accessed online], https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/ hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session60/advance-version/a-hrc-60-20-aev.pdf; Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar (2025), ‘Address to the 58th session of the UN Human Rights Council,’ OHCHR website, 19 March, [accessed online], https:// www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/myanmar/statements/2025-03-19-tom-andrews-address-to-58th-hrc.docx; Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar (2024), ‘Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the Military Junta in Myanmar,’ OHCHR website, 26 June, [accessed online], https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/ hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session56/a-hrc-56-crp-7.pdf; Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar (2023), ‘The Billion Dollar Death Trade: The International Arms Networks that Enable Human Rights Violations in Myanmar,’ OHCHR website, 17 May, [accessed online], https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/myanmar/crp-srmyanmar-2023-05-17.pdf. 89 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2023), ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct’ OECD website, [accessed online], https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/ 2023/06/oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-on-responsible-business-conduct_a0b49990/81f92357-en.pdf 90 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (2022), ‘Order On Revocation‘, FCC website, 2 February, [accessed online], https:// docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-22-9A1.pdf 91 Justice For Myanmar (2024), 'The Myanmar junta's partners in digital surveillance and censorship,' op. cit 43

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Silk Road of Surveillance: The role of China's Geedge Networks and Myanmar telecommunications operators in the junta's digital terror campaign

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Burmese
English

Topic

Digital Rights
Digital Surveillance
Internet Restrictions
Military Coup

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Justice for Myanmar

Date Published: Sep 9, 2025

Abstract: A new leaked dataset reveals the Chinese company Geedge Networks’ business in Myanmar and exposes a significant number of telecommunications companies that are implementing sophisticated surveillance and censorship technology on behalf of the illegal Myanmar military junta. The leaked dataset offers detailed insights into the inner workings of Chinese internet surveillance and censorship technology that is exported to Myanmar by a company that frames its work as associated with China's Belt and Road Initiative. The dataset has been reviewed by a coalition of media and non-governmental/civil society organisations through the Great Firewall Export project made up of Amnesty International, InterSecLab, the Globe and Mail, Paper Trail Media, Tor Project, DER STANDARD, and Follow The Money. The Internet in Myanmar since the military’s February 2021 illegal coup attempt is among the most restricted in the world. The rolling out of a commercialised version of China’s Great Firewall gives the junta unprecedented access to and control over the online activities of 33.4 million internet users in Myanmar. Notably, the hardware, software and support provided by Geedge Networks to the Myanmar military junta enables the tracking of network traffic at the individual level and can identify the geographic location of mobile subscribers in real time by linking their activity to specific cell identifiers (cell IDs). As such, the junta has an enhanced capability to effectively track down, arrest, torture and kill human rights defenders, journalists and revolutionary forces across the country. The military junta can do so with the direct assistance of telecommunications companies in Myanmar exposed in the dataset – including ATOM (formerly Telenor Myanmar), Mytel, Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), Ooredoo Myanmar, Frontiir, StreamNet , Golden TMH Telecom, Internet Maekhong Network (IM-Net), Myanmar Broadband Telecom (MBT), Myanmar Telecommunication Network (MTN), Campana, Global Technology Group and China Unicom – that are integral to the set-up of a national firewall for the Myanmar junta. This investigation into the business dealings of Geedge Networks with the Myanmar junta builds on a June 2024 report by Justice For Myanmar into how Geedge was initiating country-wide internet surveillance and censorship through the junta-controlled Information Technology and Cyber Security Department (ITCSD) of the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC). 1 By providing hardware and software to the illegal Myanmar military junta, Geedge may be aiding and abetting in the commission of crimes against humanity, including the acts of torture and killing, carried out by members of the junta within a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. Further investigation is required on this. In the meantime, Geedge Networks is limiting the rights to freedom of expression, association, and digital movement of the people of Myanmar. For that reason, Geedge Networks should be targeted with international sanctions, and individuals in directive and leadership positions within the company should be investigated for aiding and abetting violations of international human rights laws and potentially also international crimes. Telecommunications companies identified in the Geedge dataset as supporting the junta’s online surveillance machinery should be held to account for the serious risks of online and offline violence, and de facto harms such as arrests, torture and killings, of Myanmar civilians. Geedge Networks is closely affiliated with the Chinese state and export of its systems to Myanmar align with the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s involvement in the mass surveillance and repression of the civilian population in Myanmar is part of a broader pattern in which the Chinese government remains a principal supplier of arms to the Myanmar junta, aiding and abetting the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

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Silk Road of Surveillance: The role of China's Geedge Networks and Myanmar telecommunications operators in the junta's digital terror campaign

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