light of what the International Labour Organization (ILO) identified as the systematic use of child and forced labor. Even though Myanmar has received virtually no assistance from international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank 8 due to the US embargo, it has become adept at ‘resource diplomacy’, giving its Asian neighbours a bigger slice of its natural wealth in return for political, financial and military support. This strategy was successful in getting Myanmar membership of ASEAN in 1997 despite strong international opposition. A cosmetic change in 1997 was the renaming of the SLORC to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and the dismissal of some of the more obviously corrupt members of the Council.9 One of Myanmar’s biggest backers has been China which has denounced Western sanctions against the regime it props up with loans while Chinese firms build bridges, roads and factories, and dominate teak logging near the border. In September 2004 a large China Telecom delegation visited Myanmar to discuss telecom cooperation between the two countries. In June 2004 Alcatel Shanghai Bell of China signed a US$30.2 million contract with the state monopoly to install 38,500 landline connections by 2005 in addition to a US$20m 55,000 digital line contract it won in 2000 which included a US$17 million low interest loan from the Chinese government. In July 2004 the ZTE Corporation of China agreed to provide 95,000 cellular phone connections under a US$12.5 million contract. This followed a China Exim bank supported US$6.5 million contract to build 13,500-line exchanges in twelve Myanmar towns in 2002. Japan while temporarily suspending aid, has also refused to join the economic boycott and in 1995 Sumitomo received a 1 billion yen order from the MPT to install switchboards and optical fibres to update the communications network in the capital Yangon. But fellow ASEAN member countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia have showed frustration at Myanmar’s failure to make appreciable progress toward restoring democracy, to the point of pressurizing Myanmar against hosting the 2006 10-country ASEAN annual summit. Mafia Wars for Control Generals, their families and a handful of businessmen have profited in what is one of the world’s most corrupt economies, but internal rivalries among the different military cliques have engendered battles over economic turf.10 Military leadership upheaval impacts on who gets lucrative government monopolies and contracts. In 2003 General Khin Nyunt, the powerful chief since the 1980s of the National Intelligence Bureau, the body controlling the secret police and a kind of shadow government, was appointed prime minister as part of a ‘road map’ to democratization (or ‘national reconciliation process’) which involved pushing ahead with a national convention to draw up a new constitution, a process that because it excluded Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy was condemned by the United Nations. But in October 2004 following a power struggle Khin Nyunt was sacked and replaced by 8 The World Bank has approved no new lending for Myanmar since 1987, and has no plans to resume its program. (World Bank Website) 9 November 15, 1997, the SLORC announced reorganization to SPDC which is currently smaller than the SLORC with younger officers and Cabinet members. The more corrupt SLORC members and the Cabinet retired. The Tatmadaw is now the permanent military government. (Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 March 1998) 10 ‘As the size of the military elite grows, more and more influential families are competing for a slice of the same pie… the crushing of Ne Win's empire [in 2002] is a necessary step for those syndicates linked to today's rulers, if they want to ever truly control Burma's business sector.’ (Inter Press Service, 20 March 2002)