various tools. They regularly release reports detailing their actions against questionable content in order to spread awareness about their activities and the kind of content users should be aware of. Sometimes, companies communicate with each other and follow up on content which gets flagged on other platforms. The Twitter Transparency Center contains various reports on subjects such as government information requests, actions taken to enforce Twitter rules, legal demands for content removal, takedown notices, and more. Each report contains details of the particular subject, inclusive of data covering a particular time period. Facebook also shares information about CIB that the platform has acted against, for example with regard to Myanmar: We removed 79 Facebook accounts, 13 Pages, 8 Groups, and 19 Instagram accounts in Myanmar that targeted domestic audiences and were linked to individuals associated with the Myanmar military. We found this activity after reviewing information about a portion of it shared by a member of civil society in Myanmar. Our investigation revealed some links between this operation and the activity we removed in 2018. (Facebook 2021c) Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is a specialized team of security experts that works to identify, report, and stop government-backed phishing and hacking activity targeted at Google and the people who use their products. They work across Google products to identify new vulnerabilities and threats (Gidwani 2020). TAG uploads a quarterly bulletin on coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms worldwide.8 TAG also states whether their findings match those of other platforms such as Facebook or Twitter, which implies that these platforms share data and leads on suspicious activities. For example, among the various entries related to Asian countries, one from January 2021 refers to Kyrgyzstan: We terminated 6 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Kyrgyzstan. The campaign uploaded content in Kyrgyz critical of the former President Almazbek Atambayev and the opposition leader Adakhan Madumarov. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook. (Huntley 2021) I N FO R M ATI O N D I SO R D ER IN THE GLOBA L SOUTH COVID-19 With the advent and spread of the Covid-19 pandemic came a corresponding surge in mis- and disinformation related to it. Globally, platforms have taken action against the spread of this “infodemic” by employing most of the measures explained above. In Malaysia, the Covid-19 Immunisation Task Force (CITF) and Facebook Malaysia launched a series of new initiatives to combat mis- and disinformation related to Covid-19. This included a digital campaign, launched in collaboration with the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), which focused on encouraging safe behavior (e.g. wearing masks and social distancing) and correcting mis- and disinformation around Covid-19 vaccines (Dzafri 2021). Facebook has also supported the Ministry of Health in Mongolia. For instance, the Ministry of Health and the Communications and Information Technology Authority (CITA) collaborated with experts on Facebook’s public policy and advertising teams on a Covid-19 public education campaign (Anudari 2020). TikTok announced in July 2021 that it was working with the Ministry of Communications and Information in Singapore to encourage vaccination against Covid-19. The campaign intended to release livestreams with experts and public health organizations (TikTok 2021). ELECTIONS Elections offer prime conditions for information disorder. In a situation where people’s opinions are already divided, the potential for mis- and disinformation to cause harm increases to a point where it may even affect the entire country. Online platforms have taken special measures to limit the spread of mis- and disinformation during elections. Facebook has also set up “war rooms” in some countries, with the aim of fighting election-related mis- and disinformation. The company established a war room in Taipei ahead of the presidential and legislative elections in January 2020. The task force, assisted by Facebook’s regional election center in Singapore, aimed to work with the Central Election Commission (CEC) as well as political parties, law enforcement, and the camps of the three presidential candidates (Tzu-ti 2019). A similar war room was set up in Mongolia to counter mis- and disinformation and interference in the Mongolian parliamentary elections, scheduled for June 2020. With support from its US and Irish offices, Facebook was to provide 24-hour monitoring of content, Asia – 2 1 1