aimed at predicting and modulating user behavior, serve as fertile grounds for disinformation. Extremist, appealing, and informative content fosters engagement which, in turn, enhances the surveillance that the platforms carry out over the users. The growth in the power of these agents and their role in the circulation of disinformation gave rise to a series of public demands for policy measures. Some of these measures were subsequently adopted, but have been heavily criticized by researchers and civil society entities as being inadequate. In addition to demands for more concrete answers, the scenario has also provoked reactions from governments and parliaments, which have proposed new regulations focused on these agents and the practice of disinformation. The spreading of disinformation is encouraged by these platforms’ recommendation systems, which may amplify extreme discourses. The authors of misleading messages also make use of the platforms’ targeting capabilities, enabled by the profiling of billions of users. Such strategies have also been used by political groups and during electoral campaigns. The monetization potential of viral content has allowed disinformation to become a profitable business. Initially, agents began to produce and disseminate misleading The monetization potential messages to raise funds using monof viral content has allowed etization mechanisms. On the other disinformation to become a hand, disinformation practices have profitable business. also become a robust market funded by political and economic groups that seek to push their agendas through the use of political ads as a tool to reach users. It is important to understand the specificities of this phenomenon in different regions of the globe in order to avoid an analysis that takes into account only the Global North’s perspective and the modus operandi of large platforms in their host countries. The present report offers a Latin American perspective, pointing out the manifestations of and rationale behind this phenomenon in the region, with the aim of contributing to the development of an approach to the problem from the Global South. Just as important as the space where misleading content circulates is the identification of the agents that produce and disseminate these messages. Although this conduct is found across the political spectrum, there is evidence of its use by far-right groups as a political strategy in recent years.2 Groups denying science, such as anti-vaccine movements, have also been pointed out as active agents of disinformation. I N FO R M ATI O N D I SO R D ER IN THE GLOBA L SOUTH In order to discuss possible responses to this phenomenon, some clarifications are required. The first dimension is conceptual, since there are several different terms in use, such as “fake news,” “misleading news,” “disinformation,” and “junk news,” among others. In this report we follow Bontcheva and Posetti’s (2020) view of the term “disinformation,” namely that it is information intentionally produced by emulating formats such as news writing or documentary in order to obtain certain advantages or cause damage of a political or economic nature. A report by AlSur (Álvarez Ugarte 2020), a network of civil society organizations whose work is focused on digital rights in certain countries, points out that disinformation is not to be confused with satire, with other usages in which false information is protected by freedom of expression because it is not intended to deceive, or with propaganda, which is understood as speech that tries to persuade people to act or think in a certain way and which may not be false. Due to the rise of the disinformation issue as a problem with distinct repercussions, the responses to it have also grown. Such responses have been developed following various approaches, from media education courses to legislation, from fact checking and the correction of false information to the undertaking of research to understand the phenomenon. The current report focuses on these efforts, looking at initiatives developed by organizations and institutions from countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. The project aims to analyze the methods and tools developed by organizations of different types to respond to disinformation in the region and to map the actors involved in these efforts. The report is divided into two parts. Part I details the study carried out in the region. The objectives of the study are listed and the methodological approach used to map the actors in the region, and the strategies, tools, and methods employed in their initiatives against disinformation, is explained. This is followed by the results of the regional analysis. We further present case studies of five countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. In each one, we address the general scenario of disinformation in the national context, followed by a mapping of the actors involved in combating disinformation and the methods, tools, and strategies employed. Next, we focus on legal aspects related to disinformation and public sector initiatives launched by governments, parliaments, or judiciaries. A comparative analysis is used to explore the methods, tools, and strategies adopted Latin America and the Caribbean – 80