the Cybercrime Law of June 25, 2019, and therefore faced a prison sentence of six months to three years and a fine of 1 million to 5 million CFA francs. On July 28, 2020, Sabou was acquitted by the Tribunal de Grande Instance Hors Classe of Niamey on the grounds of “non-constituted offenses,” and released the same day. It should be noted that Sabou’s arrest for posting an article of this kind is not an isolated case. On July 12, 2020, the editor of the Courier newspaper, Ali Soumana, was arrested and taken into custody under the cybercrime law as well. He was released two days later following a judge’s decision. Such arbitrary persecution, arrest, and detention of journalists for online comments are a violation of Niger’s press freedom laws (Article 19 2021). 6.3 OBSERVATIONS ON THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT Based on the above data and examples, various conclusions can be drawn about legislative efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. Firstly, laws that specifically address mis- and disinformation remain rare in the region. Much of sub-Saharan Africa has relied on ancillary legislative pieces to cover areas such as mis- and disinformation. For example, in most cases, the relevant laws deal with other aspects of media or communication, such as press freedom and cybercrime. The fact that a number of these laws have been constructed in a vague way has been criticized by non-state actors; however, a number of authorities have justified why vagueness in legislation is preferred, as explained below. There is a recurring theme in most of the legislation of the forty-six countries in this study: Many laws are unclear on how to determine what is considered a “false rumor” or “false news,” or what the threshold is for deciding that information is likely to alarm the public, worry them, or provoke them against “the established powers.” I N FO R M ATI O N D I SO R D ER IN THE GLOBA L SOUTH There is often a failure to provide clear guidance for individuals, and a tendency to leave too much to the discretion of those charged with the enforcement of these laws. Those that are in favor of vague language—often authorities—argue that it enables the authorities to limit the media’s potential to influence divisions along racial or ethnic lines and/or to influence violent uprisings or other related violent activity. On the other hand, human rights defenders and lawyers have often argued that the use of vague language in legislation enables authorities to apply laws selectively to penalize government critics without the need to show that harm was caused. As has been shown in many of the case studies above, government critics, whistleblowers, and journalists alike have often been detained by authorities without good cause or where there is little certainty that charges will be brought against them. In addition, there is a lack of clarity on restrictions in the law in instances where the individual reasonably believed the information to be true. Both arguments raise important concerns from a human rights perspective. Because a number of these laws are loosely defined in their scope, authorities could interpret the legislation as giving them power to restrict a wide range of speech. The authorities might then pursue aims which would not be considered legitimate according to international human rights standards—for example, as seen in the case studies discussed in the previous section in which legislation restricts speech which might alarm the public, worry them, or provoke them “against the established powers.” Another aspect that is not explored within this discussion but which is detailed in Annex B is the penalties prescribed by legislation. A number of these laws carry penalties which seem to be disproportionate in their severity, with potentially detrimental effects on freedom of expression. Generally, speech should only be restricted where some clear, objective public harm might be caused. The aim pursued by most of these laws seem to be the protection of public safety and public order. While the restriction of speech or content in pursuance of this aim may be legitimate, the scope of what might cause alarm amongst the public, worry them, or provoke them against “the established powers” is potentially much broader than “public order.” In cases such as these, restrictions would not be pursuing a legitimate aim. Discussions are ongoing on the relevance, scope, or limitations of legislation that is currently being drafted to counter information disorder. Most Sub -Saharan Africa – 1 65