was later adopted by democratic governments to entrench political power. Governments were thus, traditionally, the main producers of disinformation, and journalists had to learn to treat journalism as a contested area vulnerable to manipulation by governments (Mare, The push to privatize stateMabweazara, and Moyo 2019). owned media and the However, the push to privatize stateemergence of independent owned media and the emergence of independent media organizations media organizations over over the last few decades have the last few decades have not only failed to dismantle statenot only failed to dismantle sponsored propaganda but also made state-sponsored propaganda both private and public organizations but also made both private vulnerable to manipulation (Nyabola and public organizations 2018). In fact, some point to the failure of journalists and traditional vulnerable to manipulation. media outlets to fulfil their role as bastions of truth as a key enabler of information disorder (Mare, Mabweazara, and Moyo 2019; Wasserman 2020). This can be attributed to capture by political or business institutions, abdication of the responsibility to verify information before publication, the need for media outlets to compete for audiences, a reliance on online media business models, and poor reporting, amongst other things. While social media and online content are significantly implicated in the growth of information disorder, digital access is still low in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In 2019, mobile internet adoption stood at 26 percent, while average individual internet use in the region was reported to be 29 percent (GSMA 2019; ITU 2019). Further, data from a 2018 survey by Research ICT Africa, titled “After Access 2018: A Demand-Side View of Mobile Internet from 10 African Countries,” show that several of the African countries surveyed had a critical mass below 15 percent, less than the 20 percent threshold required to enjoy network effects such as enhanced information flows (Gillwald and Mothobi 2019). This points to the possibility that the information ecosystem in sub-Saharan Africa functions differently from that in highly connected environments. Subnational differences in infrastructure, basic and digital literacy, economic opportunity, and language groups further complicate the landscape. In some Western countries, increasing levels of political polarization are fueling people’s preferences for social media echo chambers, creating a formidable barrier to the acceptance of corrected information, since notions of “credible” information sources have been distorted. It is unclear to what extent such echo I N FO R M ATI O N D I SO R D ER IN THE GLOBA L SOUTH chamber effects exist in sub-Saharan Africa, but any attempts to address mis- and disinformation in the region must consider this possibility, especially in view of ethnic divisions in many parts of the continent, which are often aligned with political groups and reflected in partisan media and online spaces. State-led efforts to ameliorate the spread of “fake news” in sub-Saharan Africa have led to the introduction of laws that have done more to repress freedom than to lessen mis- and disinformation. In fact, such actions have further contributed to information disorder, as they are often justified by claims that are themselves forms of mis- or disinformation. For example, Kenya and Zimbabwe have witnessed press censorship and election manipulation, while in Uganda independent media houses have been shut down and minority rights have been suppressed through legislation. Although legislation could be used to curb information disorder, since 2012 there has been an exponential increase in the regressive use of legislation by governments in the region, ostensibly to counter falsehoods and mis- or disinformation. A particularly steep spike in such legislation occurred in 2020, in the form of regulations related to Covid-19. However, the impact of penal and media and communication laws on curbing the spread of falsehoods is unknown (Mare, Mabweazara, and Moyo 2019; Yadav et al. 2021). Triggered by the acceleration of mis- and disinformation during the Covid-19 pandemic, certain high-profile national elections, and the resurgence of threats to press freedom, several initiatives have emerged in recent years to confront information disorder in sub-Saharan Africa. This report identifies actors working to counter information disorder in sub-Saharan Africa and the approaches they are using. It also discusses the legal, regulatory, and human rights contexts within which these actors are working. While the emergence of the internet has changed the way information (and mis- or disinformation) is produced and consumed, the situation is often more nuanced than what is portrayed in both the media and the academic literature. In particular, information disorder in subSaharan Africa cannot be viewed from a Western perspective, which assumes wide access to digital technologies and where a great deal of fake news can be attributed to the rise of alt-right political groups. Rather, it should be viewed in the context of conditions such as highly uneven digital access, rural/urban economic divides, and underdeveloped democratic systems. Sub -Saharan Africa – 1 40