Background: History of Hate Speech in Myanmar FFM presented its findings in August 2018 and recommended that senior generals in the Tatmadaw be investigated and prosecuted for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.142 After the FMM’s mandate ended in September 2018, the UN Human Rights Council, established the Indepen- dent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (“IIMM”) as a repository of evidence.143 Subsequently, in November 2019, the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) opened an investigation into the alleged forced deportation of the Rohingya from Myanmar to Bangladesh.144 That same month, The Gambia filed a case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) for allegedly violating its obligations under the the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“The Genocide Convention”).145 Growing Ultranationalist Support for the Tatmadaw These recent steps toward international accountability for the Tatmadaw’s atrocities should have been welcome news in a country that has struggled for democracy and human rights in the face of a repressive military rule. Instead, the reaction from those inside Myanmar has been commonly one of denial and rejection—with hate speech and rampant misinformation campaigns both online and offline playing a central role in mobilizing public sentiment against criticism of the military and the government. Political leaders, including the civilian government have been criticized for aligning with the mili- tary, not supporting accountability efforts, and perpetuating the othering of minorities, particularly the Rohingya. In her first public address following the Rohingya crisis, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi stated that “after a century or more of authoritarian rule, now we are in the process of nurturing our nation,” and that “as a young and fragile country facing many problems,” Myanmar “cannot just concentrate on the few.”146 She has refused to condemn the Tatmadaw and has personally defended Myanmar at the ICJ genocide proceedings.147 However, she is not alone in her failure, as a moral and political leader, to condemn or even acknowledge the violence and hate aimed at the Rohingya. Even former political prisoners like Ko Ko Gyi and Min Ko Naing have justified the military’s operations in Rakhine State. Ko Ko Kyi, for example, has espoused similar rhetoric as 969 and Ma Ba Tha with regards to the Rohingya: namely, perpetuating the idea that they are not an ethnic group originally from Myanmar.148 Political leaders’ rejection of the 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 “Myanmar: Tatmadaw Leaders Must Be investigated for Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, August 27, 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23475&LangID=E. Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, A/HRC/42/50 (August, 2019), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G19/236/74/PDF/G1923674.pdf?OpenElement International Criminal Court, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, on Opening a Preliminary Examination Concerning the Alleged Deportation of the Rohingya People from Myanmar to Bangladesh (September 18, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180918-otp-stat-Rohingya. Owen Bowcott, “Gambia Files Rohingya Genocide Case against Myanmar at UN Court,” The Guardian, November 11, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/11/gambia-rohingya-genocide-myanmar-un-court. Rebecca Wright, Katie Hunt, and Joshua Berlinger, “Aung San Suu Kyi Breaks Silence on Rohingya, Sparks Storm of Criticism,” CNN News, September 19, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/18/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-speech-rohingya/index.html. Ibid. Hla Myaing, “An Open Letter to 88 Generation Student Leader Ko Ko Gyi,” July 30, 2012. See generally: Francis Wade, “Myanmar’s Enemy Within: Buddhist Violence and the Making of a Muslim ‘Other’” (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2017). 29