Background: History of Hate Speech in Myanmar of nationalist propaganda by the Tatmadaw and replicated the military’s playbook, utilizing fear and division between communities as a means to advance its goals.78 Many Myanmar CSOs believe that 969 and Ma Ba Tha receive substantial support and resources from the Tatmadaw, hardliners, and private cronies. Some have gone so far as to say that 969 and Ma Ba Tha are a “non-weaponized civilian wing of the Tatmadaw.”79 Former monks like U Gambira, who fled Myanmar in 2016, have openly stated that, “Military leaders approached our fellow monks with offers of financial support and gifts. . . . This emboldened the monks to rise up and speak up in public to spread the pro-military propaganda, spreading hatred between religions.”80 There is evidence of at least implicit approval of the ultranationalist groups’ actions. Over the span of a few years, they have managed to operate freely, spread hate speech and intolerance, support a series of discriminatory laws, and initiate a series of anti-Muslim riots across Myanmar.81 None of these would have been possible without at least the implicit permission or endorsement from the military and the USDP government.82 969 and Ma Ba Tha have in turn openly supported the military while criticizing its opponents: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD, and EAOs.83 969 emerged on the national stage by encouraging people to support Buddhist-owned busi- nesses instead of Muslim-owned ones.84 As Muslims have been well represented in Myanmar’s mer- cantile community since the colonial era, the movement tapped into historic inter-ethnic tensions— specifically Buddhists’ historic perception and resentment of financially successful Muslims.85 Some prominent Buddhist monks have also fueled anti-Muslim sentiment by delivering mes- sages along ethnic and religious lines. For instance, U Wirathu, who refers to himself as the “Burmese Bin Laden,” had been jailed in 2003 for inciting anti-Muslim violence.86 Soon after his release from prison, he began giving sermons throughout the country vowing to patriotically defend Myanmar and Buddhism against Islam and the “enemy within.”87 In June 2012, the rape and murder of Thida Htwe, a Buddhist woman, allegedly committed by three Muslim men in Rakhine State became the vehicle 969 and U Wirathu used to incite and unleash violence against Rohingya Muslims.88 969 characterized the rape as an honor crime and disseminated online graphic photos of her corpse along with incendiary remarks about her killers’ identities and re- ligious backgrounds.89 They fanned longstanding historical tensions between the Rakhine Buddhists 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 2017), 6-8. “An Unholy Alliance: Monks and the Military in Myanmar,” Al Jazeera, March 18, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/ programmes/specialseries/2019/03/unholy-alliance-monks-military-myanmar-190309083316608.html. Focus group discussions from convenings held in January 2019 and December 2019 [hereafter “FGD (January2019 and/or December2019)”]. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Hannah Beech, “The Face of Buddhist Terror,” Time, July 1, 2013, http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,2146000-3,00.html. Matthew J. Walton and Susan Hayward, “Contesting Buddhist Narratives: Democratization, Nationalism, and Communal Violence in Myanmar,” East-West Center Policy Studies 71 (2014), 14, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/ default/files/private/ps071.pdf. Beech, “The Face of Buddhist Terror.” Ibid. Human Rights Watch, All You Can Do Is Pray: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State (June 2013), 21, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/04/22/all-you-can-do-pray/ crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims. Ibid., 33. 23