Executive Summary 6. Those that question or challenge the aforementioned narratives—HRDs, activists, and CSOs—are “race traitors” and foreign agents who are equally dangerous to the nation’s sanctity and security. Key Drivers Hate speech in Myanmar is not simply the product of individual bigotry and intolerance, and the aforementioned narratives were not created in a vacuum. Rather, hate speech has been systemati- cally promoted and disseminated by powerful interests that benefit from the constructed narratives and the resulting division and conflict in society. CSO members identified a number of key drivers of hate speech in Myanmar beyond ultranationalist groups. Those drivers include the military, political leaders, business interests, and religious leaders. While the Rohingya crisis has diminished the military’s stature internationally, the crisis has had the opposite effect domestically, strengthening the military’s legitimacy and allowing its nationalist message to reach people who had fervently opposed the military dictatorship in the past. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government has also been largely ineffective in addressing the rise of hate speech. It has failed to adequately act against ultranationalist groups and has instead succumbed to military and political pressure to distance itself from the Muslim community. Several CSO members interpreted the government’s inaction as condoning hate speech and, even worse to at times exhibit its own nationalist biases. Statements from various government ministries and de- partments, including the President and State Counsellor’s Office, highlight for example the depth of officials’ animus and discriminatory attitudes toward the Rohingya community. Channels and Forms of Dissemination With the rapid rise in Internet connectivity, propagators of hate speech have increasingly turned to on- line channels to disseminate their messages. Facebook, the main social media platform in the country, has played the most significant role. Many in Myanmar perceive information circulated on Facebook as reliable due to limited digital and social media literacy, cheap and easy access to Facebook, and the use of the social media platform by government institutions and major media outlets in Myanmar as their principal communication channel to the public. Relative user anonymity, difficulties associated with monitoring and removing content in a timely manner, and the dominant status of Facebook has made the platform a powerful avenue for the dissemination of hate speech. Despite diligent monitoring attempts from CSOs and some remedial measures taken by Face- book, significant challenges remain for tracking and stopping hate speech on the platform. One major challenge has been that removing specific posts, accounts, or pages does not necessarily prevent further circulation of the posted content. A second challenge has been technological discrepancies between codes and displayed texts that make content detection more difficult. A third challenge has been ensuring that content moderators hired by Facebook fully understand Myanmar’s political con- 3