Third World Quarterly 137 such as Rakhine State in Myanmar and Aluthgama in Sri Lanka, several interviewees were engaged in or knowledgeable of peace work also in these areas. The interviews were held in English when possible and in local languages with the use of an interpreter when necessary (10 interviews). Some observations of peace activities were also carried out. Although the limitations in time and space do not allow for an all-embracing picture of the researched movements, the study points to some broad trends that subsequent research can further enquire into. Buddhist nationalism in contemporary Myanmar and Sri Lanka In Myanmar, the charismatic Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu has become a forthright front figure of the new Buddhist nationalist movement. The movement, which also includes numerous other respected monks, rallies around the need to protect Buddhism from the threat posed by Islam in general and Muslim minority groups in Myanmar in particular. Ma Ba Tha emerged as the main Buddhist nationalist organisation in the country in 2014, promoting laws for the protection of race and religion. The rise of radical Buddhist organisations – most prominently 969 and Ma Ba Tha – coincided with a series of violent clashes between Buddhists and Muslims in 2012–2014, which killed hundreds and left thousands homeless in Rakhine state and other parts of the country (ICG 2013). Simultaneously in Sri Lanka, an upsurge of Buddhist nationalism was also spearheaded by radical Buddhist monks. Several new organisations – most importantly Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) – appeared in 2012–2014, a few years after the end of a 26-year-long civil war. These groups policed against defamatory use of Buddhist texts and images, levelled accusations against and attacked Muslim businesses, fought against halal certification and agitated for the preservation of sites of Buddhist archeological value (Silva 2016; Haniffa 2016a). Several parallels could be seen between the two countries. Not only did the Buddhist nationalist movements develop during the same period and share an anti-Muslim rhetoric, they also stressed the importance of strengthening Buddhists economically in the face of Muslim business competition and pushed for legal changes to protect Buddhists against minority religions. In 2014, Wirathu visited Sri Lanka on the invitation of BBS (see Schontal and Walton 2016; Gravers 2015; Holt 2016). Both movements worry that the Buddhist population is disadvantaged in relation to Muslims, who presumably reproduce at a higher rate, convert Buddhist women through mixed marriages, and dominate economically. Their anti-Muslim sentiments also draw strength from the global discourse of fear of militant Islamist groups such as Islamic State (IS). Their anti-Muslim stance resonates with the views of large parts of the Buddhist populations in the two countries, as well as among Buddhist clergy (Schissler, Walton, and Thi 2017; Herath 2019). In Myanmar, ‘the Muslim issue’ has colonial origins, as (mainly Muslim) migrants who moved there from India during British rule were framed as an Indian ‘other’ (Crouch 2016). In Sri Lanka, the 1915 riots against Muslims, triggered by a conflict about a religious procession, make up a first historical example of the framing of and attacks on Muslims as a threatening ‘other’ (Holt 2016). In both countries, Buddhism has been closely connected to state power. Buddhist nationalism has sometimes been propagated by the rulers and other times by the opposition and civil society. The Buddhist nationalist movements are hence not new social movements; the links between preservation of the nation and the protection of Buddhism trace back