Third World Quarterly 145 They definitely are taking the social media as a tool […] All those anti-Muslim [stories] were there before ICT [Information and Communication Technology] … these stories become much more compelling and convincing with images and videos. Internet becomes a medium of spreading that to the whole country. (interview 30) In Sri Lanka, one interviewee commented: ‘The hate at the time of the BBS against Muslims on the pro-BBS sites was by order of magnitude unimaginably greater than the worst hate of the Tamils at the height of the war’ (interview 2). Facebook has been slow to respond to the hate speech. Many posts do not violate Facebook rules. The burning Shwedagon, for instance, did not explicitly call for violence against Muslims, and news reports about Islamist terror are not in themselves defamatory, but contribute to an understanding of Muslims as dangerous and foreign (interviews 22; 38). Even content that breaks the rules stay up a long time. Facebook has also lacked competence to monitor hate speech in Sinhala and Burmese (interview 2; Stecklov 2018). A crucial task for those wishing to counter the radial Buddhist groups is hence to engage with social media. Panzagar (Flower Speech) is one example of a campaign where activists developed online stickers urging people to ‘end hate speech with flower speech’. From its release in February 2015 to May 2016, they reached 2.7 million downloads.5 The My Friend Campaign launched in 2015 encouraged people of different religious or ethnic backgrounds to post selfies of their friendship (The Observers 2015). In Sri Lanka, the Not in Our Name campaign was created by activists and media persons in April 2012 following monk-led mob violence against a mosque. Numerous other initiatives followed, such as Buddhists Questioning Bodu Bala Sena and Sri Lanka Unites. Counter messaging against the Sinha-Le (Lion’s blood) sticker fad of 2016 played on the word by saying that everyone has Manusat-Le (human blood), or made fun of the nationalists as having Bota-Le or Athul-Le (alcohol blood or jail blood) (interview 6). Peace activists hence used the same technologies as the Buddhist nationalist movement in their attempts to oppose it. Civil society organisations also educated people on news literacy, the use of social media to combat hatred, and Facebook reporting mechanisms. Activists did counter-messaging and created social media content promoting harmony, but often not in a structured way (interview 30). ‘Those who create awesome content which go viral are not the peacebuilding people’, one interviewee in Myanmar commented (interview 38). An activist in Sri Lanka said: ‘Civil society does not know what to do with social media. NGOs have no strategy, no vision, no human resources, no idea’ (interview 2). Online just as offline, the Buddhist nationalist movement was perceived to be stronger than the mainly reactive movement for religious coexistence. There are some monks and religious leaders who are writing against Ma Ba Tha, some who write about the real teachings of Buddhism, and some about the importance of human rights […]. Compared with the hate movement it is very small. Partly because systematic hate [messages on] fake accounts are very active; it is difficult to fight back (interview 22). Also online, there was a risk of spiraling radicalisation: ‘If the Sinhalese nationalists put a photo that was derogative, Muslims would also attack, and do something similar’ (interview 37). Buddhist radical groups actively used social media to fight back against the peace movement. Religious leaders and activists who openly promoted inter-religious coexistence frequently became targets of smear campaigns and mudslinging. A monk in Sri Lanka said: