Third World Quarterly 143 will misunderstand him’ (interview 36). Monks participating in interfaith activities could face accusations of breaking rules, a decline in donations and even death threats (interview 22). Arrests, surveillance, obstruction of inter-religious festivals and attacks on social media also restricted the space for peace activism. Most interviewees, in both countries, had faced problems due to their activism. To be able to continue their work, activists used various strategies. One Muslim interviewee used another name and worked with non-Muslim resource persons when organising workshops, to avoid threats from Ma Ba Tha (interview 24). Keeping a low profile and building trust with the local population were other tactics (interviews 7; 9; 24): ‘It was our strategy not to talk against anything. Positive messaging. It was obvious that we were targeting them [BBS] but we did not directly say so’ (interview 10). Activists described a situation where few persons would openly speak out against the Buddhist nationalist groups: ‘They [Muslims] are just quiet, they cannot do anything. If they do something against society or the people, the man [U Wirathu] will attack and the authority also. They cannot do anything, they cannot demonstrate’ (interview 27, Myanmar); ‘There are some counter-voices in the sangha [Buddhist clergy], but they are not seen as credible. They are being projected as supported by the West’ (interview 1, Sri Lanka). Another reason that monks did not speak out against anti-Muslim agitation was that although they did not approve of the tactics of BBS and Ma Ba Tha, many saw Muslims as a problem (interview 18; Herath 2019). Some, however, publicly challenged the nationalists and their use of Buddhism to justify hatred and violence. ‘Buddha spoke about kindness to all beings’, a monk who had opposed the anti-Muslim violence in Sri Lanka in 2018 said: ‘A monk cannot advocate killing, assaulting, scolding, burning property and so on. Creating hatred is a powerful sin. […] We are here to get rid of suffering of ourselves and suffering of others. So, a monk cannot spread hatred’ (interview 20). The movement–countermovement dynamics hence involved contestations about how religion should be interpreted and practiced. From this study emerges a picture of a peace movement which is very much shaped and restrained by the Buddhist nationalist movement. In the ‘loosely coupled tango’ that Zald and Useem talk about, the nationalists lead and the peace activists follow. The peace movement made some attempts to, like the Buddhist nationalists, organise public protests. But they mainly concentrated on counteracting them through public opinion formation, advocacy and direct interventions in conflicts. As pointed out by social movement scholars, opposing movements also need to be understood in relation to the state (Zald and Useem 1987). Regime shifts in Myanmar in 2016 and Sri Lanka in 2015 meant that the governments to a larger extent endorsed the message of the peace movement, and condemned the actions of the Buddhist nationalists. Incidents of violence against Muslims initially declined, but increased again with the military campaign against Rohingya in Myanmar 2016–2017 and communal violence in Sri Lanka in 2018. The establishment of an Office for National Unity and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka in 2015 enabled collaboration between the government and civil society organisations on interfaith issues (interview 12). Inter-religious dialogue and reconciliation had also been part of government discourse earlier, with the organisation of peace camps by the President’s office under Rajapaksa’s rule, and the forming of local interfaith groups throughout Myanmar in 2015 (interview 35). In October 2017, NLD organised large