142 C. ORJUELA polarising and violent impact on society. It was not obvious, however, that the counter-mobilisation would take the form of a movement for peace and inter-religious understanding. The Buddhist nationalist upsurge also risked triggering a radical Muslim response. Interviewees said: ‘Sadly the counter movement will also be extremist’ (interview 1); ‘Because of the current discrimination faced by the Muslim community they also become more extreme, more radicalized’ (interview 22). Avoiding such a spiral of radicalisation was a main task for the peace and interfaith activists (interviews 3; 4; 8; 10; 32). An interviewee in Myanmar feared that if the Muslims confronted the Buddhist nationalists they would face problems. ‘In our [Muslim] community, many young people want to [mobilise] against, [but] we try to put it down’ (interview 24). ‘It is very dangerous to openly attack Sinhala Buddhist sentiments […] They [Muslim and Christian religious leaders] do not make their voice heard; rather, they try to talk to mainstream Buddhist monks [and] political leaders. They know that it may create a negative effect if they become outspoken’ (interview 4; see also Bauman & Ponniah 2017, 74–75). The Buddhist nationalist mobilisation hence gave rise to intrareligious discussions about the response (cf. Appelby 2008, 126). The peace movement was perceived as much weaker than the Buddhist nationalist movement and largely reactive. A peace activist in Myanmar said: The Ma Ba Tha group and extremist groups are quite well organised. When they want to do something, they can bring everyone to do it. They have strategy, commitment. Since 2012–13 they [have] gradually organised across the country. Now they even have the law, the race and religion law. It is a success story, and they even have their own high school now. For us, where are we? We do this and that; it is quite a reactive activity. They are quite pro-active, [and carry out] lots of attacks on us. (interview 33) In Sri Lanka, a scholar and activist commented: ‘In terms of … their ability to mobilise public support, the nationalist civil society is stronger. They have the upper hand. But the strength of the non-nationalist civil society is that they have a strong activist base’ (interview 4). Some talked about the counter-mobilisation as attempts to ‘fight back’ (interview 8). An organiser of the Rally for Unity said: Five of us got together and said: If they [BBS] can put a stage in each place in the country, and on stage talk about hate, get the loudspeaker permit [and] police protection for these meetings, could we not do the same and talk about unity and understanding? (interview 10) Here we see how the counter-mobilisation mimics the movement it wishes to oppose. Rally for Unity also appropriated BBS’s symbols and slogans: [In our] graphics, we used the same colours as BBS. If they say ‘Let’s safeguard the country from falling to pieces’, we put the same slogan, changing it to: ‘Let’s be united and go further together. Let’s not make this country into pieces’. So we would hijack their slogan. You are small but going one-on-one [with them]. (interview 10) The peace movement was not only triggered but also severely constrained by the Buddhist nationalist groups. Many Buddhist monks avoided interfaith activities due to fear. ‘They [monks] don’t like to do something against them [Ma Ba Tha and other groups] because they are the majority. We are a minority. So they hesitate to organise with the minority’ (interview 34; see also Walton and Hayward 2014, 30–34). Peace and interfaith activists reported a wide range of threats and dangers. In Myanmar, monks faced pressure within the monastic community. ‘It is sensitive issues. If a monk says something about peace, others