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Myanmar ARTICLE 19 the military has nonetheless imposed changes to Myanmar’s legal regime which further complicate the environment for companies. The primary relevant laws include: • Telecommunications Law 2013 (amended in 2017): 176 Several provisions of this law enable surveillance. Section 75 allows the government to require ‘the relevant organisation’ to provide access to information and telecommunications which cause harm to national security or respect for the law ‘as may be necessary’. Although there is a clause calling for respect for fundamental rights, the vagueness of this provision and lack of concrete procedures could easily provide legal cover for problematic surveillance practices. Similar concerns are raised by Section 76, which enables entry and inspection of telecommunications service providers for matters related to national defence, security, or the public interest. In emergencies, Section 77 empowers the Ministry of Transport and Communications to order suspensions of telecommunications services, intercept or obtain information, cease operations of specific forms of communication, or temporarily control telecommunications equipment. ‘Emergencies’ are not clearly defined, and the military has declared the country under a state of emergency since the 2021 coup. • Counter-Terrorism Act 2014 (amended in March 2023): Section 47 empowers a counterterrorism committee to issue orders for the interception or restriction of electronic communications of ‘terrorist groups and terrorists’.177 The new Counter-Terrorism Rules issued in 2023 set out procedures for this interception. These rules lack basic due process protections, and the authorising committee is not independent from the military.178 The rules explicitly state that telecommunications companies should not refuse the committee’s orders to intercept or restrict communications.179 These powers are likely to be applied extensively, as the military has applied the terrorist label broadly, including to members of the civil disobedience movement and peaceful opposition. • Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017; amended 2020 and 2021) (Privacy Law):180 This law provides some very general privacy protections but does not constitute a proper data protection regime. Shortly after the 2021 coup, the military announced an amendment which suspended some sections of the law for as long as the ____________________________________________ 176 Telecommunications Law, No. 31/2013, 8 October 2013, English translation; MLL Law Library, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw No. 26/17 : Amendment of Telecommunications Law, 28 August 2017, English translation. For a full analysis of this law see ARTICLE 19, Myanmar: Telecommunications Law, 2013, March 2017. 177 Counter Terrorism Law, No. 23/2014, 4 June 2014, English translation. 178 Access Now, Myanmar’s ‘Counter-Terrorism’ By-Laws Must Be Denounced for What They Are – Illegal, 19 April 2023. For a partial English translation of the by-laws, see Lincoln Legal Services (Myanmar) Limited, Counter-Terrorism Rules, 1 March 2023. 179 Lincoln Legal Services (Myanmar) Limited, Counter-Terrorism Rules, Rule 80(d). 180 Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, No. 5/2017, 8 March 2017, English translation (with post-coup military changes integrated). 43

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Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

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Information Operation
Internet Restrictions

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Article 19

Date Published: Oct 5, 2024

Abstract: In this report, ARTICLE 19 reviews the human rights context and responsibilities of tech companies operating in 3 authoritarian countries in Asia, namely China, Myanmar, and Vietnam. It focuses on the rights to freedom of expression and privacy, and the manner in which authoritarian states directly or indirectly expect companies to assist them in censoring content, promoting propaganda, accessing user data, and engaging in surveillance. While these are undoubtedly highly challenging contexts, companies have not sufficiently prioritised protecting human rights in their policies and actions. States are the primary duty bearers under international human rights law, but companies also have human rights responsibilities, as outlined in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Even if domestic law or circumstances make it impossible for companies to fully meet their human rights responsibilities, they should take action so as to respect human rights standards to the greatest extent possible. Tech companies should not merely reference local law as an excuse for collaborating in rights violations. They should take steps such as those detailed in this report, like adopting appropriate policies, asking governments to justify content removal requests clearly and specifically, and reporting transparently on their compliance with government demands. For each country, we survey the country context and provide an overview of legal obligations which companies operate under that are problematic from the perspective of international human rights law and that may, as a result, put pressure on companies to become complicit in violations of the rights to freedom of expression and privacy. We then explore how Western tech companies operating in these countries, many of which have explicitly stated their commitment to respecting freedom of expression and privacy, have responded to these legal obligations and to other government expectations that they will cooperate in violations of these rights.

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Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

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