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Myanmar ARTICLE 19 Country context In a February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military overthrew the elected government, reversing almost a decade of fragile democratic reform. Pre-publication censorship had been abolished in 2012, and this was followed by a period of expansion in the media and information landscape. Use of ICT services also exploded with liberalisation and the opening of the telecommunications sector to private and foreign investor. 165 Democratic reforms were modest, however, and freedom of expression challenges remained. After the 2021 coup, the military could not easily regain the tight control of the information space which it had enjoyed prior to the process of democratisation. Instead, it turned to a range of oppressive measures to suppress dissent. Civic space has become highly constrained and the military is quick to bring criminal charges against anyone who expresses opposition to it or to military rule. As of October 2023, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners had verified more than 25,000 arrests related to the military’s seizure of power since the coup.166 Courts now rubber-stamp military-supported prosecutions. Martial law is in force in several regions, enabling civilians to be tried in military courts and sentenced to death or life imprisonment for a range of crimes, including mere speech offences like spreading false news.167 Violent suppression by the military of opposition protests has also accelerated broader armed conflict across Myanmar, and the country is now experiencing acute humanitarian needs and a civil war marked by consistently brutal tactics by the military regime. The primary tool for arresting those who express dissent online is criminal charges under Sections 505 and 505-A of the Penal Code. Section 505-A, a new provision imposed by the military shortly after the coup, criminalises causing fear, spreading false news, or agitating for crimes against a government employee, and has been applied en masse to people who are affiliated with movements opposing the coup, as well as celebrities, artists, journalists, and those who post expressions of dissent on social media. In the year following the coup, almost 4,000 people were confirmed to have been arrested and detained under Sections 505 and 505-A, with the total number likely being much higher.168 Other arrests have also been made under the Law on Counterterrorism and other older Myanmar criminal content restrictions. Internet shutdowns and disruptions are now common in the country. Prior to the coup, Myanmar had already imposed one of the world’s longest internet shutdowns, in the states ____________________________________________ International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield, 2021. Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, Daily Briefing in Relation to the Military Coup, 16 October 2023. 167 International Commission of Jurists, Myanmar: A Year after Military Takeover, No Rule of Law or Judicial Independence, 10 February 2022. 168 Free Expression Myanmar, New Report: 505A Act of Revenge, 31 January 2022. 165 166 41

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Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

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Information Operation
Internet Restrictions

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Article 19

Date Published: Oct 5, 2024

Abstract: In this report, ARTICLE 19 reviews the human rights context and responsibilities of tech companies operating in 3 authoritarian countries in Asia, namely China, Myanmar, and Vietnam. It focuses on the rights to freedom of expression and privacy, and the manner in which authoritarian states directly or indirectly expect companies to assist them in censoring content, promoting propaganda, accessing user data, and engaging in surveillance. While these are undoubtedly highly challenging contexts, companies have not sufficiently prioritised protecting human rights in their policies and actions. States are the primary duty bearers under international human rights law, but companies also have human rights responsibilities, as outlined in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Even if domestic law or circumstances make it impossible for companies to fully meet their human rights responsibilities, they should take action so as to respect human rights standards to the greatest extent possible. Tech companies should not merely reference local law as an excuse for collaborating in rights violations. They should take steps such as those detailed in this report, like adopting appropriate policies, asking governments to justify content removal requests clearly and specifically, and reporting transparently on their compliance with government demands. For each country, we survey the country context and provide an overview of legal obligations which companies operate under that are problematic from the perspective of international human rights law and that may, as a result, put pressure on companies to become complicit in violations of the rights to freedom of expression and privacy. We then explore how Western tech companies operating in these countries, many of which have explicitly stated their commitment to respecting freedom of expression and privacy, have responded to these legal obligations and to other government expectations that they will cooperate in violations of these rights.

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Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

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