Previous 21 / 63 Next

China ARTICLE 19 security safeguard system, preventing and punishing the dissemination of unlawful and harmful information, and maintaining cyberspace sovereignty.50 • Counter-Terrorism Law 2015 (amended in 2018): Articles 18 and 19 of this law require telecommunications operators and internet service providers (ISPs) to provide technical support to security authorities to prevent and investigate terrorist attacks; to establish monitoring systems for terrorist content; and to comply with orders to disrupt transmissions, close websites, or delete information in response to terrorist or extremist content.51 • National Intelligence Law 2017 (amended in 2018): This law imposes a general obligation on organisations to support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts and authorises intelligence actors to access communications tools, buildings, and relevant files and materials in the course of their work.52 • Counter-Espionage Law 2023: This revised and expanded law grants fairly expansive powers to state security organs to inspect facilities and electronic equipment and to access relevant data in the course of counter-espionage activities.53 There are also numerous regulations governing the online space, including the operations of intermediaries. These are too numerous to detail here, but key recent regulations include: • Provisions on the Governance of the Online Information Content Ecosystem 2019: These provisions consolidate earlier regulations into a more systematic framework of rules.54 They address 3 types of content: illegal content, defined in broad categories such as endangering national security, undermining honour, or opposing the Constitution; negative content, such as sensational or vulgar content; and encouraged content, such as that which promotes ‘Xi Jinping Thought’55 and other pro-CCP content. Internet users, content producers, and service platforms all have different responsibilities vis-à-vis these types of content. All are also supposed to avoid specified activities, including using networks for illegal conduct such as defamation and threats or registering fake accounts.56 ____________________________________________ 50 National Security Law, Articles 25 and 59. China Law Translate, Counter-Terrorism Law (as amended in 2018), unofficial English translation, 27 December 2015, Article 84. 52 China Law Translate, PRC National Intelligence Law (as amended in 2018), unofficial English translation, 27 June 2017, Articles 7 and 16–17. 53 China Law Translate, Counter-espionage Law of the P.R.C. (2023 ed.), unofficial English translation, 26 April 2023, Article 25–26 (among others). 54 R. Davis, China’s New Internet Censorship Rules Outline Direction For Content, Variety, 3 January 2020. 55 For an explanation of ‘Xi Jinping Thought’, see ARTICLE 19, The Digital Silk Road: China and the Rise of Digital Repression in the Indo-Pacific, 2024, p. 18. 56 China Law Translate, Provisions on the Governance of the Online Information Content Ecosystem, unofficial English translation, 21 December 2019, Articles 21–25. 51 21

Select target paragraph3

● ● ●

Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

Report

Preview

Language

English

Topic

Information Operation
Internet Restrictions

Author(s)

Article 19

Date Published: Oct 5, 2024

Abstract: In this report, ARTICLE 19 reviews the human rights context and responsibilities of tech companies operating in 3 authoritarian countries in Asia, namely China, Myanmar, and Vietnam. It focuses on the rights to freedom of expression and privacy, and the manner in which authoritarian states directly or indirectly expect companies to assist them in censoring content, promoting propaganda, accessing user data, and engaging in surveillance. While these are undoubtedly highly challenging contexts, companies have not sufficiently prioritised protecting human rights in their policies and actions. States are the primary duty bearers under international human rights law, but companies also have human rights responsibilities, as outlined in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Even if domestic law or circumstances make it impossible for companies to fully meet their human rights responsibilities, they should take action so as to respect human rights standards to the greatest extent possible. Tech companies should not merely reference local law as an excuse for collaborating in rights violations. They should take steps such as those detailed in this report, like adopting appropriate policies, asking governments to justify content removal requests clearly and specifically, and reporting transparently on their compliance with government demands. For each country, we survey the country context and provide an overview of legal obligations which companies operate under that are problematic from the perspective of international human rights law and that may, as a result, put pressure on companies to become complicit in violations of the rights to freedom of expression and privacy. We then explore how Western tech companies operating in these countries, many of which have explicitly stated their commitment to respecting freedom of expression and privacy, have responded to these legal obligations and to other government expectations that they will cooperate in violations of these rights.

Link: source

Primary Documents

ETIF-Thematic-Report-12Sep-24.pdf
English
Download View

Myanmar Internet Project

Select target paragraph3

Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

Primary Documents

Notifications