C6: ၀န်ေဆာင်မ,ေပးေသာ ကFမiဏီများY4င ့် အြခားနည်းပညာကFမiဏီများသည် အစိးF ရအား ၎င်းတိ၏ F ့ အသံးF ြပMသNများ၏ 0 မ4တ ် ဆက်သယ ွ မ ် ,ကိF ေစာင့D် ကည့ ရ ် ာတွင ် ကNညရ ီ န် လိအ F ပ် ပါသလား။ (၀-၇ မ4တ)် C6: Are service providers and other technology companies required to aid the government in monitoring the communications of their users? (0–6 points) Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 as the lack of separation between the military and service providers enables authorities to access user data with no restrictions. Service providers are obliged to hand data over to the state without sufficient oversight or safeguards. Myanmar lacked a robust data protection law, despite years of calls from a range of private-sector and civil society stakeholders.301 The military imposed amendments to the Electronic Transactions Law in February 2021, adding a new chapter on personal data protection which falls far short of international standards. The amended law does assign some duties for data controllers, but those duties are ill-defined and amended bylaws were not published.302 The amendment also obliges data controllers to hand data over to the state without sufficient oversight or safeguards. The Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, passed in 2017 and partially suspended since the coup,303 prohibits the interception of personal communications without a warrant, but it contains a vague exception allowing surveillance if permission is granted by the president or a government body. The law does not outline clear procedures to prevent data from being collected, stored, and destroyed, nor does it provide for judicial review. The law’s definition of privacy is inadequate and inconsistent with international human rights standards.304 The Telecommunications Law grants the government the power to direct unspecified persons “to secure any information or communication which may harm security, rule of law, or peace of the state.”305 The Telecommunications Law also grants the government the power to inspect the premises of telecommunications firms and to require them to hand over documents—for the ill-defined purposes of defending the “security of the state” or “the benefit of the people”—without safeguards for 0 individuals’ privacy and other human rights.306 A 2018 amendment to the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law included a new provision requiring telecommunications firms to disclose user information without due process.307 The draft Cyber Security Law proposed in January 2022 would require platforms and service providers with over 100,000 users in Myanmar to store data on servers designated by and fully accessible to the military, functionally amounting to data localization. The bill also imposes wide retention requirements for user data.308 There is little room for providers to push back against the military’s directives, and the military’s direct or indirect control of service providers in Myanmar facilitates even more direct access to user data. Between February 2021 and February 2022, the military-controlled MoTC handed Telenor more than 200 data request orders under the Telecommunications Law,309 compared to 188 requests in 2019 and about 70 in 2018.310 Telenor reportedly complied with all of the requests submitted after the coup; each required call records and call locations spanning months, and in total covered thousands of users.311 The largest stateowned service provider, MPT, has never publicized the number of requests for data it receives from authorities. Mytel stated that it received over 100 requests in 2019 but has not published numbers since.312 In at least one instance during the coverage period, providers did successfully resist a military order for information. In March 2022, a regional military official ordered service providers to disclose subscriber lists in order to identify who still had internet access; the companies reportedly appealed successfully to the military on the grounds that the move would violate their license requirements. 313 Prior to the coup, telecommunications providers claimed that the majority of requests were related to human trafficking, missing people, and drugs.314 ် ပ်မ/ - ြမန်မာ2ိင 4 င ် ံ Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) and Freedom House - Freedom of the Net: Myanmar - အင်တာနက်ေပ*တွင် လွတလ