အေ8ကာင်းအရာများကိ& ကန်သတ် ြခင်းများ ့ Limits on Content B1: အင်တာနက်ေပ: 34ိ အေDကာင်းအရာကိF ပိ တဆ ် မ, Fိ ့ (သိ)F ့ စစ်ထတ F မ ် ,ကိF အစိးF ရမ4 ြပMလFပ်ပါသလား (သိ)F ့ အင်တာနက် ၁ မ4တ ် ဝန်ေဆာင်မ,ေပးသNများအား ထိသ F ြပMလF Fိ ့ ပ်ရန် ဖိ အားေပးပါသလား။ (၀-၆ မ4တ)် B1: Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content? (0–6 points) The military has consolidated two distinct blocking regimes. Mobile service providers must block all websites except for 1,200 addresses approved by the military. All fixed-line and wireless broadband service providers, which serve just a small proportion of the public, allow access by default but block many specific addresses. Information about the two blocking regimes was not publicly disclosed during the coverage period. The military-controlled MoTC regularly issued secretive blocking orders to service providers following the coup—several per week during the most violent periods—containing hundreds of thousands of addresses to block.83 The military’s first order arrived on February 3, 2021, to block Facebook and WhatsApp.84 Orders to block Twitter and Instagram arrived on February 5,85 followed later by blocks on most independent media outlets and international sources of information such as Wikipedia (see B6).86 Some blocking orders were reversed in May 2021.87 Although blocking orders are hidden, more websites, including media, have been blocked subsequently.88 On May 25, the military ordered mobile service providers to block all websites and internet protocol (IP) addresses except for 1,200 approved addresses that included a large contingent of banking and financial sites, a small number of entertainment sites like YouTube and Netflix, news sites such as the New York Times and US-based Cable News Network (CNN), and gaming platforms.89 The list of approved addresses has been irregularly updated since, but only to add business applications, including local businesses.90 Facebook, Twitter, and most independent Burmeselanguage media outlets were not listed and therefore remain blocked. Instagram, YouTube, 1 WhatsApp, LinkedIn, Viber, and Zoom appear to remain accessible. Telenor disclosed that MoTC orders issued in 2021 required telecommunications companies to block access to URLs and IP addresses under Section 77 of the Telecommunications Law, which allows authorities to issue blocking orders to license holders in “emergency situations.”91 The military cited reasons like “preserving stability” and preventing “fake news” from “spreading misunderstanding.”92 Service providers did not implement blocking orders consistently,93 as some addresses were blocked by some providers but not by others.94 For example, Facebook was accessible via at least one broadband provider, despite being subject to a blocking order,95 and for some Mytel subscribers, despite not being on the list of approved sites.96 It was unclear whether this was due to confusion, technical difficulties, or discretion; some staff at service providers reportedly tried to limit the effects of military orders by interpreting them narrowly or subverting their application.97 Prior to the coup, the NLD government had directed service providers to block more than 2,100 addresses in 2020, most from Interpol’s list of banned child sexual abuse websites.98 The NLD government also controversially issued blocking orders for 67 websites for publishing so-called “fake news,” including well-known independent media outlets99 and civil society organizations critical of the military.100 Telenor initially resisted blocking media outlets101 but later complied for fear of losing its license.102 The military’s attempts to block censorship circumvention tools such as virtual private ် ပ်မ/ - ြမန်မာ2ိင 4 င ် ံ Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) and Freedom House - Freedom of the Net: Myanmar - အင်တာနက်ေပ*တွင် လွတလ