Myanmar: Analysis of the Organisation Registration Law and potentially leading to self-censorship so as to avoid the risk of a negative decision. The precise status of NGOs with temporary certificates is not articulated clearly in the NGO Law, which could also create operational challenges for such NGOs, for example if banks or other institutions demand a final certificate. NGO registration procedures should also be clear and precisely articulated. As noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders, overly vague legislation “easily lends itself to abuse and discretionary interpretation by registration officials.” 79 In contrast, elements of the registration procedure under the NGO Law are unclear, including the manner in which registration boards will review applications, renewal procedures and the degree of discretion afforded to registration boards. Better practice is for States to have a prior notice or approval system, by which registration is automatically approved upon submission of the appropriate paperwork, instead of an authorisation regime.80 If authorities have discretion to deny registration, this must be on limited, precise and clearly articulated legal grounds which comply with international human rights law. 81 A denial of registration is “the most extreme measure” by which governments limit freedom of association, particularly when operating without registration can result in criminal sanctions, as is the case in Myanmar.82 Denials must therefore be in accordance with the three-part test for restrictions on freedom of association. The NGO Law does not contain sufficient controls to ensure that denials are limited and in compliance with the three-part test. The most clearly articulated ground for denying registration is harm to State sovereignty, the rule of law, security or national unity. Not all of these reasons are legitimate aims under the three-part test and the provision is not defined clearly enough to ensure that it will be applied only as necessary and in a proportionate manner. The NGO Law also indicates that boards have other discretion to deny registration or that additional grounds could be introduced via regulation. This ambiguity is concerning and fails to meet the “prescribed by law” requirement in the three-part test. Procedures permitting registration boards to deny registration should also be clearly articulated, require a written rationale explaining any decision to deny and offer opportunities for “effective and prompt” appeal.83 The NGO Law leaves important aspects of the procedure for deciding on applications to regulation and includes an ill-defined screening process by the relevant sector government body. It also does not provide for an appeal, instead providing only one opportunity to re-apply with the same board, at which 79 Ibid., para. 71. 2012 Report of the Special Rapporteur on assembly and association, note 17, para. 58. 81 OSCE and Venice Commission, note 33, para. 154; Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa, note 14, para. 13; and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 31 December 2011, para. 541(19), https://bit.ly/40FWCxT. 82 2009 Report of the Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders, note 34, para. 67. 83 Ibid., para. 113. 80 The Centre for Law and Democracy is a non-profit human rights organisation working internationally to provide legal expertise on foundational rights for democracy. 17