Myanmar: Analysis of the Organisation Registration Law In comparison with the 2014 Law, the NGO Law creates ambiguity as to the composition of the boards. No total number of members is listed, so the composition of the boards could easily be altered via decree or by the appointing body. Section 5(g) allows the body responsible for appointing the boards to “reform the bodies as prescribed”, conferring even greater discretion on it. The NGO Law also effectively eliminates non-military representation on the boards. The Union Registration Board created by the 2014 Law consisted entirely of government-affiliated representatives, but these were from a variety of ministries and members from civilian-led ministries dominated. Under the 2022 NGO Law, the only named members of the national board are from military-controlled entities. For other registration boards, the NGO Law eliminates civil society representatives and reduces the diversity of government representatives. Under the 2014 Law, all boards except for the Union board had two NGO representatives, elected according to procedures decided by local organisations themselves. Specific positions were also guaranteed for representatives from a greater range of government entities, although admittedly with a strong law and order background (such as police representatives).49 The new NGO Law eliminates this diversity. At the district and township level, GAD influence is particularly acute. The NGO Law gives the GAD administrator complete discretion to appoint the board, which he or she also chairs, and all named members are GAD administrators. Because GAD administrators at the district and township level are appointed and are responsible to their GAD superiors, 50 local registration boards could easily serve as military informants or act on military instructions. A practical concern is that these structures could easily facilitate corrupt behaviour, for example on the part of township and district administrators who have significant control over their boards. Petty bribery in exchange for basic administrative functions has been a common and increasing problem since the coup, including on the part of local GAD officials in relation to NGO activities.51 3.3. Assessment against International Standards 49 2014 NGO Law, sections 5 and 39. Before the coup, township and district administrators effectively had dual reporting lines to GAD as well as to regional or state governments. See Batcheler, et al., note 40, p. 54. They have always been appointed as civil servants, in accordance with section 288 of the Constitution, unlike ward and village administrators which became elected positions in reforms undertaken before the coup. 51 ICNL, “Myanmar Civic Space Assessment: Overview and Preliminary Key Findings”, November 2022, https://bit.ly/3I4H3bE. See also Frontier, “Motivating the Minions”, 17 September 2022, on file with CLD. 50 The Centre for Law and Democracy is a non-profit human rights organisation working internationally to provide legal expertise on foundational rights for democracy. 11