three sub-clauses vaguely criminalizing “causing fear”, “spreading false news”, and “committing or agitating for an offense against a government employee”. In the same few days, the military “amended” the Code of Criminal Procedure (1898) to remove due process protections, and “suspended” for an unspecified period the privacy rights granted under the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017). The military later changed the media regulatory framework and began to wield it more oppressively. The Broadcasting Law (2015) was “amended” in 2021 to restore media crimes and expand the scope of application to cover all media content online. The new provisions did not define media content, and therefore could feasibly apply to anybody publishing anything online. The Printing and Publishing Law (2014) was “amended” in 2023 to strip away the law’s few procedural safeguards and make arbitrary revocation of media licenses easier.85 The military continued to change the criminal law framework. For example, the CounterTerrorism Law (2014) was first “amended” in 2021 after the coup started to significantly increase penalties for several of the vague crimes included within that restricted freedom of expression, such as provisions banning “persuasion” and “propaganda”.86 The military later “amended” the law again in 2023 to expand its surveillance powers. The military also added legitimate opposition groups, such as the National Unity Government (NUG), to the Counter-Terrorism Law’s (2014) list of sanctioned terrorist organizations, effectively ensuring that positive or even impartial media coverage of the NUG was tantamount to terrorist incitement and could attract significant penalties for journalists. MILITARY “COURTS” Several of the military’s “Orders” established a new system of military tribunals with jurisdiction over particular laws in townships that the military had placed under martial law. The list of laws that were placed under the tribunals’ remit included media regulatory laws, such as the News Media Law (2014), and criminal laws restricting freedom of expression, such as the incitement provisions in the Penal Code (1861). The tribunals were extra-legal both because they were created by unlawful military “Orders” and because there was no constitutional legal basis for them.87 There was little to no information publicly available on the tribunals’ procedural rules, besides them being closed courts in which defendants had no rights to legal representation or to appeal. Criminal cases that did not fall within the jurisdiction of military tribunals were processed by “special” courts set up within prisons.88 Special courts were also closed 85 Center for Law and Democracy (2023), “Note on amendments”. 86 For more information on how the military has used and “amended” the law, see: ICNL (2023), “Impact of counter-terrorism measures in Myanmar”. 87 The military tribunals were not “courts martial” as established in the constitution and other laws to regulate military affairs. 88 The civil society organization, FEM, has attempted to understand and explain how the military’s new court system works based on key informant interviews with lawyers and defendants. For more information, see: FEM (2023), “Myanmar military’s ‘justice’ system”. Assessing Detentions of Journalists in Myanmar, Feb. 2021 to Feb. 2025 30