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Table 2. Ethno-Political Conflict: Problems and Outcomes
Knowledge
Attitude
Existing Problem
Desired Outcome
on-Bamar ethnic cultures, histories, and grievances
N
misunderstood
enuine understanding of other ethnic cultures,
G
histories, and grievances
ontrasting understandings of history between ethnic
C
groups (particularly as related to conflict)
etter appreciation of the unique histories of different
B
ethnic groups
Non-Bamar collective memory of abuse and broken
promises
on-Bamar trust in both government and Bamar majority
N
and awareness that means to rectify injustices are
available
Bamar paternalism
amar respect for other ethnic groups’ right to
B
self-determination
Bamar and military belief in unity via assimilation
Conflicting aspirations (national unity versus ethnic
autonomy)
Other groups seen as equal partners in Myanmar
transition
Myanmar belief in unity in diversity
nified vision for Myanmar’s future based on federalism
U
and both resource and power sharing
Bamar negative stereotypes of other ethnic groups
Positive stereotypes of all ethnic groups
Non-Bamar ethnic group negative Bamar stereotypes
Non-Bamar victim mentality
Behavior
Mistrust
on-Bamar trust in government and Bamar majority and
N
means to rectify injustices
Culture of violence
Trust in political process
State discrimination against non-Bamar ethnicities
Discrimination not tolerated
Violent suppression of non-Bamar ethnicities
Peaceful political participation to achieve goals
Ethnic-based separatist insurgency
tween Buddhist and Muslim communities have surfaced before—but its modern incarnation
appears more virulent. Before the current transition process, reporting on communal violence
occurred only through the state media, which did not allow the same scope and spread of information as the current online and legacy media space. Beginning in Rakhine State in July 2012,
after a picture of a Buddhist woman who had allegedly been raped was circulated by local media, incidents of physical violence between Buddhist and Muslim communities have occurred
in Okkan, Meiktila, Lashio, Thaton, and elsewhere.3 Hundreds have been killed and more
than 150,000 displaced in this violence.4
International commentary often presents the violence as the result of interreligious tensions between an aggressive Buddhist majority and a persecuted Muslim minority. Religion
is a convenient oversimplification to discuss the conflict but tends to obscure the separate and
interconnected social, economic, and political causes—each with discernible knowledge, attitudinal, and behavioral elements.
According to multiple expert interviewees, an important root cause of the conflict is the
perceived threat to Buddhist identity and power posed by the gradual permeation of Muslim
people, culture, and religious practices in both Myanmar and Asia as a whole. The Buddhist
faith has historically been a central pillar of nationalist policy. According to Buddhist and
Muslim interviewees, modern-day Buddhists sometimes perceive Islamic values as antithetical
to their own and fear that the proliferation of this identity will distort the culture and values of
Myanmar society. In the words of one interviewee, “Buddhism needs protection from outside
influence. Other countries are losing Buddhist influence, and we don’t want that here.”
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