III. Responses by the Former Government of Bangladesh and the U.N. Refugee Agency 52 have killed, tortured, abducted, and threatened Rohingya refugees.”249 Special Rapporteur Andrews also reported on ARSA’s likely responsibility for the assassination of prominent Rohingya refugee leader Mohib Ullah in the camps.250 Despite the Special Rapporteur’s findings and the Bangladesh government’s public commitment to investigate Mohib Ullah’s assassination, the government continued to deny the existence of ARSA. In response to the Special Rapporteur’s report, the former Bangladesh Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen said: “[Tom Andrews] talked about ARSA, but we did not see any presence of ARSA here. ... If he identified any ARSA member and shared the information with us, we will send them to their country. We want to see the ARSA people [he is talking about].”251 On March 16, 2022, the Special Rapporteur published a country report to the Human Rights Council that included a lengthy annex highlighting his Bangladesh mission findings, including details on human rights abuses by ARSA in the refugee camps and other violations against Rohingya in Bangladesh as well as the government’s refusal to acknowledge ARSA.252 The report states: When the Special Rapporteur brought these security concerns to the Bangladesh Government, highlighting the dangers that the Rohingya claimed that ARSA was creating, senior officials were often dismissive of the claim and attributed security issues in the Cox’s Bazaar [sic] camps to unspecified criminal gangs and miscreants. These officials insisted that there is no ARSA presence in the refugee camps.253 As per the protocol of the U.N. special procedures, the Government of Bangladesh would have been briefed on these findings in advance of the publication of the Special Rapporteur’s report on March 16. On the same day of the Special Rapporteur’s report publication, the former Government of Bangladesh officially, and finally, acknowledged ARSA and its involvement in the assassination of Mohib Ullah.254 A Bangladesh official stated, “[ARSA] thought Mohib Ullah and his organization had become more organized and popular than ARSA. So they killed him.”255 Despite its failure to publicly acknowledge the existence of ARSA, evidence suggests that the Bangladesh government was previously aware of ARSA and its activities inside the camps. For example, Fortify Rights reviewed a memo from the Bangladesh Army marked “confidential” and dated February 15, 2022, citing the presence of ARSA and an “increase in terrorist activities in the FDMN [Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals] camps.” 256 The memo also cites incidents of ARSA activities in 2021.257 The confidential memo further details actions by Bangladesh security forces to combat ARSA, including “special operations in coordination with joint forces to apprehend identified terrorists and recover illegal weapons.”258 The memo outlines three raids on “ARSA” or “ARSA terrorists” in 2021 and 2022.259 249 UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, “Mission to Bangladesh 13 - 19 December 2021,” End of Mission Statement, https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/03/mission-bangladesh-1319-december-2021. 250 Ibid. 251 “U.N. Rapporteur: Rohingya Militants Kill, Abuse Refugees in Bangladesh Camps,” Radio Free Asia, December 20, 2021, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/un-rohingya-12202021171519.html. 252 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, A/HRC/49/76, June 13, 2022. 253 Id. at p. 23. 254 “Insurgents Murdered Rohingya Leader,” Agence France Press, March 16, 2022, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/ bangladesh/crime-justice/news/insurgents-murdered-rohingya-leader-2984026. 255 Ibid. 256 “FDMN” is a euphemism for “refugees,” reflecting Bangladesh’s refusal to acknowledge Rohingya as refugees. Confidential Bangladesh Army memo reviewed by Fortify Rights, February 15, 2022. 257 Ibid. 258 Ibid. 259 Ibid.