iMAP Myanmar 2023 Internet Censorship Report | Page 37 Conclusion During the two years of the coup, the military has made multiple attempts to reinstate the internet censorship policies and online oppression of the past decade in order to limit access to information for pro-democracy activists. The State Administration Council (SAC) seeks to strengthen its monitoring efforts primarily by controlling one of the online information flows. Any content that opposes or indirectly criticises the military is considered illegal and punishable by law. In this report, independent researchers through the iMAP project conducted a study on the most recent censorship trends and events in Myanmar. In particular, we looked at network interference in Myanmar by examining blocking websites, instant messaging, and circumvention tools from OONI measurement data from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2023. Out of a total of 2,477 websites, 177 were identified as confirmed blocked using the largest DNS and HTTP blocking methods. According to the study, the highest number of confirmed blocked websites is observed in the government category, primarily by two ISPs. On 8 April 2022, the MoTC discreetly issued a directive to prohibit any websites that oppose the SAC, including the National Unity Government (NUG) and Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Representative Committee (CRPH). Additionally, social network websites are the second most frequently blocked sites, followed by militant content. Out of a total of 177 websites, 104 websites were blocked sites from last year. During a Facebook messenger test, numerous anomalies were detected, including failed DNS lookups and TCP connections across 39 ASNs. It can be concluded that Facebook messenger is likely blocked most of the time. Signal and Whatsapp have been identified as potential targets of interference, as they may be accessible through certain ISPs on certain days but are more likely to be blocked. Telegram appears to have access across most vantage points. The majority of circumvention tools, such as Psiphon, Tor, Tor Snowflake, and Vanilla Tor, appear to be accessible for users in Myanmar most of the time. The censorship in Myanmar has been steadily increasing. The 2022 OONI report found 112 blocked sites out of 2,130 by DNS and HTTP level interference rights after about one year of the coup. After two years of the coup, the OONI still found that the military surveillance continues to restrict information flows through blocking 73 new websites, communications, and circumvention tools in 2023. Myanmar is ranked “not free” by Freedom on the Net report. To improve the status of freedom of information and expression in Myanmar, OONI is working to identify internet interference through blocked websites, instant messaging tools, and circumvention tools that people in Myanmar primarily rely on. However, OONI is unable to collect censorship measurements from outside of the country. Hence, it relies on volunteers who are based in the country and are willing to contribute to the data. There are multiple ways to volunteer. Together, we can help identify internet interference by contributing to this study. Contribute to the study If you would like to contribute to the OONI measurements, there are several ways to get involved: