infrastructure.24 The legal void in which the industry is developing raises concerns that citizens may be exposed to increased government surveillance and control.25 23. Telecommunications company Telenor has said that it will not launch its services until the government had finalised its laws on communication interception.26 Ooredoo, which launched its services in August 2014, has not announced how it will respond to government request for interferences with communications.27 24. As noted by the Navi Pillay, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in her report on privacy in the digital age, “There is a strong evidence of a growing reliance by Government on the private sector to conduct and facilitate digital surveillance”.28 She requested that companies must have their own internal policies in place, as well as due diligence policies to “identify, assess, prevent and mitigate any adverse impact” on the human rights of users. When requested to provide data or access that fails to meet international human rights standards, they should interpret the these demands as narrowly as possible, as well as request clarification on scope and legal premise for request, a court order and be transparent with users when they received such requests.29 Surveillance and monitoring systems 25. In 2011, the Citizen Lab of the University of Toronto published research documenting30 the use of Blue Coat Systems' commercial filtering products in Myanmar.31 Blue Coat32 allows the surveillance and 24 25 26 27 28 29 Calderaro, A., Digitalizing Myanmar: Connectivity Developments in Political Transition, Internet Policy Observatory, pp. 3. Available at: http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/app/uploads/2014/12/Digitalizing-Myanmar.pdf Ibid, pp. 3 Telenor Group, Telenor in Myanmar: Privacy & Freedom of Expression. Available at: http://www.telenor.com/media/in-focus/telenor-in-myanmar/sustainable-business-in-myanmar/privacyfreedom-of-expression/ Purdon, L., The Challenges and Opportunities of Myanmar's new ICT Networks, Institute for Human Rights and Business, Commentary, 16 September 2014. Available at: http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/challenges-and-opportunities-myanmar-new-ict-networks.html A/HRC/27/37, para. 42 Ibid, para. 43-45 30 The research findings were based on the following evidence, (i) ISP hostnames matching Blue Coat add-on names, (ii) network error pages found were generated by Blue Coat’s ProxySG system, and (iii) strong correlation between Blue Coat’s categorization of these URLs and those URLs found blocked by the researchers. 31 CitizenLab, Behind Blue Coat: Investigations of commercial filtering in Syria and Burma, 9 November 2011. Available at: https://citizenlab.org/2011/11/behind-blue-coat/ 32 Blue Coat is a company specialised in online security but it is well know for having sold Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology based equipment to an array of countries. See: https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Planet-Blue-Coat.pdf