International Crisis Group Asia Report N°348 18 June 2025 Executive Summary The Arakan Army’s defeat of the Myanmar military in northern Rakhine State has shifted Rohingya armed groups onto the front foot. After years of bloody infighting in Bangladesh’s refugee camps, these groups, which claim to represent the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine, agreed in November 2024 to work together to fight the Arakan Army, which draws support mainly from the state’s Buddhist majority. Since then, violence has fallen sharply in the refugee camps, while the groups have expanded recruitment. At the same time, the Bangladeshi government has started engaging tentatively with the Arakan Army, which controls all of Myanmar’s border with the country. Mounting attacks by Rohingya armed groups in Rakhine are not only likely to undermine these talks, but could also heighten anti-Rohingya sentiment in Myanmar, damaging prospects for the repatriation of up to one million refugees. Bangladesh should curb the influence of Rohingya armed groups in the camps and step up dialogue with the Arakan Army, which for its part should take concrete steps to show it can govern in the interests of all communities. When the Arakan Army began pushing into northern Rakhine State in early 2024, the outnumbered Myanmar military sought to mobilise the Rohingya Muslim minority in the state to fight alongside it. The military forcibly recruited Rohingya men into militia units, worked with community leaders to attract volunteers and cut deals with Rohingya armed groups – a startling turnaround, given that these outfits had previously battled Myanmar’s authorities, ostensibly in defence of Rohingya rights. This mobilisation slowed the Arakan Army advance, but the military was unable to stave it off entirely. Many Rohingya opposed the decision to align with the Myanmar military. The Arakan Army’s rhetoric and alleged abuses of Rohingya in northern Rakhine, however, spurred a good number of refugees to view the ethnic armed group as a bigger threat than the military. Even before the fall of Maungdaw township in December 2024, which marked the Arakan Army’s complete takeover of northern Rakhine, Rohingya armed groups had begun repositioning themselves. They reached a “harmony” agreement in November and held a large “unity” rally in the refugee camps the following month, urging Rohingya attendees to join the fight to take back northern Rakhine by force. They enlisted religious leaders to legitimise their campaign, which they frame as a “jihad” against “non-believers”. Until recently, most refugees resented these groups, due to the violent tactics they had used. Nonetheless, strong negative sentiment toward the Arakan Army and fears that repatriation will remain elusive have made refugee camps more fertile recruiting grounds for the armed groups. Bangladeshi security agencies, which have long maintained relations with both Rohingya armed groups and the Arakan Army, have backed the “unity” campaign. While they insist that their intention is to reduce violence in the camps, they appear to be using Rohingya armed groups as a means of compelling the Arakan Army to take back refugees. Though it remains unclear whether they are providing material support to the groups, the involvement of these security bodies threatens prospects for nascent dialogue between the Bangladeshi government and the Arakan Army, which now controls all the areas from which Rohingya refugees fled in 2017.