Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 Page 25 VI. Conclusion The November 2024 truce between Rohingya armed groups has brought welcome relief from the bloody turf war of the past two years in Bangladesh’s sprawling refugee camps. But it has had a sting in its tail, opening the door for these groups to expand recruitment within the camps, mobilise support for an armed campaign and lay the basis for a sustained Rohingya insurgency against the Arakan Army in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The consequences of a resurgence of war in the region would be devastating. Even in the unlikely scenario that these groups were able to wrest territory from the Arakan Army, it would come at a high human cost while also turning the Rohingya into pariahs in the eyes of Myanmar’s other anti-regime forces as well as for much of the public in the country. Insurgency is not the answer to the Rohingya refugee crisis. Growing support for armed struggle in the camps reflects how desperate most refugees are: now that the Arakan Army has taken over the areas they fled from, many doubt that they will ever be able to return home. With aid also dwindling, despair among refugees has reached alarming depths. Even so, Bangladesh, the Arakan Army and outside actors have an opportunity to restore a semblance of hope. Bangladesh should help improve living conditions in Rakhine by allowing cross-border aid and trade, while also bringing an end to its dealings with Rohingya armed groups. The Arakan Army should pursue dialogue with Rohingya civilian leaders to build trust and explore viable options for repatriation. Foreign powers should strive to maintain support for the humanitarian response, though funding cuts make it imperative for Dhaka to find ways to reduce reliance on aid. Failure to take these steps could sow the seeds of an even greater disaster across northern Rakhine State and southern Bangladesh. Cox’s Bazar/Dhaka/Brussels, 18 June 2025