Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 Page 22 proposal, calling it a threat to national sovereignty.113 Domestic disputes over the issue now mean that Dhaka is even less likely to bring a formal corridor to fruition. But in light of Rakhine’s humanitarian emergency, along with the danger of a larger influx of refugees if no aid reaches the state, it should keep pursuing talks with the Arakan Army about informal cross-border assistance – now the only feasible option. Dhaka should also allow more informal trade between southern Bangladesh and northern Rakhine – not just in food, but also in construction materials and agricultural inputs that are desperately lacking due to the military regime’s blockade. Given that Rohingya have traditionally been the main intermediary, this commerce would not only help make goods more affordable for everyone in northern Rakhine, but it could also foster greater cooperation between the Rohingya community and local Arakan Army leaders. Bangladesh’s overriding concern remains a peaceful solution to the refugee crisis. But the growing influence of Rohingya armed groups within the refugee camps undermines the prospects of achieving one. It will be extremely difficult for Dhaka to improve relations with the Arakan Army and pursue talks on repatriation while these outfits are mobilising within the camps and building support for armed struggle – let alone carrying out attacks in northern Rakhine. While dismantling the groups would be a tall order, the Bangladeshi government and security agencies should improve coordination to ensure that their influence is checked. As a priority, the security forces should take stronger measures to prevent armed group members from recruiting in the camps, as well as to discourage religious and community leaders from supporting such campaigns. Security agencies should also increase monitoring to prevent armed group members from entering the camps and cut off the flow of weapons. Ideally, they should encourage the groups to abandon armed struggle for political activism. Bangladeshi civilian officials should also ensure that their actions cannot be interpreted even as tacit support for the armed groups, refraining from meeting their members or echoing their rhetoric. Dhaka, meanwhile, should avoid references to establishing “safe zones” within northern Rakhine, a phrase that interim government leader Muhammad Yunus himself has used several times. Regardless of the merits of a safe zone in Rakhine, for Arakan Army leaders, the concept of a protected area for the Muslim minority amounts to a partial loss of territory that has just been wrested from the Myanmar military after years of fighting, at great human cost. Meanwhile, whichever party comes to power in Dhaka in the elections due to take place between December 2025 and June 2026 will need to ready itself to manage the Rohingya crisis. Both the front runner, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and other forces should ideally avoid any move to exploit the issues of the Rohingya and Rakhine for political gain, as such attempts would likely harm relations with the Arakan Army and undermine prospects for repatriation. 113 These criticisms likely have less to do with the humanitarian corridor than with tensions between the interim government, on one side, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and army chief Wakar-Uz-Zaman, on the other, over the government’s reluctance to announce a date for elections. Both Wakar and BNP leaders have argued that an unelected interim government has no mandate to establish a humanitarian corridor. See, for example, “National election should be held by December”, Prothom Alo, 22 May 2025.