Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 Page 18 for greater engagement. Partly as a result, there has been little follow-up to the initial meeting between Khalilur Rahman and the Arakan Army in February. “The [Rohingya armed groups] look stronger than before. Almost weekly, the militants are entering our territory and opening fire or kidnapping, and then they are running back to Bangladesh. Who is supporting those militants?”, asked a senior Arakan Army official.102 The damage to relations between Bangladesh and the Arakan Army will only increase if Rohingya armed groups step up the frequency and intensity of their attacks in northern Rakhine. Developments in the camps are also shaping the group’s thinking, particularly regarding the support seemingly given to figures like Dil Mohammed, who is known to be close to the Myanmar military. From the Arakan Army’s point of view, Bangladesh is playing a dangerous and counterproductive game. At best, Bangladesh could be adopting a carrot-and-stick approach, using the threat of a Rohingya insurgency in northern Rakhine State to force the Arakan Army into taking back Rohingya refugees into its newly conquered territory. But the group also fears that Bangladesh intends to use Rohingya armed groups to seize part of northern Rakhine by force. A senior Arakan Army official told Crisis Group that Bangladesh’s references to “safe zones”, along with recent comments from Jamaat-e-Islami, the main Bangladeshi Islamist party, that China should support the creation of an independent Rohingya state, suggest a possible “hidden agenda”. “Because of these things we don’t know what Bangladesh really wants. But they are not combating the illegal activities and militancy. So, what is their purpose? It looks like they are trying to organise something”, he said.103 More broadly, the prominence of these groups in the camps and parts of Rakhine is likely to damage prospects for reconciliation between refugees in Bangladesh and the Arakan Army, making repatriation even more difficult. Armed groups are displacing civilian Rohingya leaders, who may be more willing to pursue dialogue with the Arakan Army. C. Conflict and Reprisals Worsening conflict between Rohingya armed groups and the Arakan Army would be devastating for the Rohingya who remain in northern Rakhine State. Insurgents are likely to base themselves in and around Rohingya villages, making it difficult for Arakan Army forces to distinguish fighters from civilians. Rohingya communities could be caught between opposing armed combatants and might feel compelled to seek sanctuary in Bangladesh, triggering new refugee flows at a time of diminishing international aid. Perceived Bangladeshi support for Rohingya forces could heighten the Arakan Army’s threat perceptions, probably even beyond the real capacity of the armed groups, and thus prompt a harsh crackdown. In some areas of Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships where ARSA is carrying out attacks, reprisals are already under way. The insurgent raids have drawn a predictable response from the Arakan Army, which has carried out “clearance operations” targeting suspected ARSA hideouts. In February, one of these operations around the village of Mee Tike, close to the Bangladeshi border, sparked several days of fighting. 102 103 Crisis Group interview, Arakan Army official, May 2025. Crisis Group interview, Arakan Army official, May 2025.