Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 Page 16 IV. Anticipating the Fallout It is not yet clear that Rohingya armed groups are planning to launch a major insurgency against the Arakan Army or will even be able to develop the capacity to do so. But their growing influence in the camps and regular recruitment activities, alongside shifting attitudes toward armed struggle among refugees, risk destabilising the border region, given the effects they could have on the Rohingya community’s relations with the Arakan Army, Bangladesh’s attempts to engage the armed group and how the Muslim minority is perceived within Myanmar. A. Control of the Refugee Camps Although armed groups have always been present in Cox’s Bazar and held varying levels of power in the area’s 33 refugee camps, they are now the most influential Rohingya organisations in the sprawling settlements. “It’s clear that the armed groups are the ones who rule the camps”, said a 23-year-old teacher from Camp 9, where the RSO is the dominant force. “Civil society groups are now supporting them. … Previously, religious leaders did not, but now they are saying it is mandatory for us to fight the Arakan Army”.93 A 34-year-old man from Camp 10 said the RSO had grown strong in his camp by extorting money from residents. “No one in my community supports the armed groups, but we all fear them”, he said.94 Achieving such sway will have a range of likely consequences. The presence of Rohingya armed groups has already compromised the camps’ civilian character, putting refugees at greater risk of violence and exploitation. It could undermine the ability of humanitarian organisations to deliver assistance.95 Because armed group leaders are all men, it is also likely to reinforce gender stereotypes and stifle already limited opportunities for women to participate in civil society activities, let alone take on leadership roles. Armed groups and their members also tend to promote, and sometimes enforce, strict interpretations of Islam, particularly in relation to the role of women in society and how they should dress.96 The dominance of armed groups also makes it much more difficult for civilian Rohingya leadership to emerge. After the mass exodus to Bangladesh in 2017, civil society flourished at first, as ARSA had not yet established full control and the political environment was more permissive than in northern Rakhine State. But Bangladeshi government restrictions – particularly after a mass demonstration in the camps in August 2019 prompted a public backlash – and the growing strength of ARSA, which viewed civil society as a threat to its authority, soon narrowed the space for peaceful political activities in the camps.97 In particular, the killing in September 93 Crisis Group interview, Rohingya refugee from Camp 9, February 2025. Crisis Group interview, Rohingya refugee from Camp 10, February 2025. 95 Crisis Group interviews, humanitarian agency officials, March 2025. 96 See, for example, Fadela Novak-Irons, “Rohingya Refugee Women Empowerment – Enhancing Programming for Women and Girls in the Refugee Camps of Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh”, 30 April 2025. 97 On 25 August 2019, large crowds of refugees – some media reports put the number at 200,000 – demonstrated to mark what they referred to as “genocide day”, ie, the anniversary of the outbreak of violence in northern Rakhine State in 2017 that triggered the mass exodus. See Crisis Group Report, A Sustainable Policy for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh, op. cit. 94