Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 Page 9 the camps have been frequent.50 Interviews with Rohingya refugees conducted in February and March 2025 suggest that the truce, unity campaign and framing of the conflict in religious terms have bolstered perceptions of the armed groups, with more men and women expressing outright support. “I think it’s good for us that all the Rohingya armed groups are cooperating and fighting the Arakan Army for our rights and homeland”, said a 25-year-old woman teacher from Camp 19, where the RSO is dominant.51 Yet many refugees remain critical of their actions and wary of their motivations. As a man residing in Camp 11 said: “The armed groups treat us badly because their members are all uneducated and poorly trained – it’s just young men with weapons”.52 An elderly man in Camp 10 concurred, saying group members “don’t treat people as human beings. … The younger members don’t even show respect for the elderly in the camp”.53 A woman refugee added: “This cooperation [between the groups] is just propaganda – it doesn’t help us get our rights or property from the Arakan Army. But I must admit that ARSA, the RSO and the ARA are popular right now in the camps”.54 The growing presence of armed outfits in the camps has left women and girls feeling scared and vulnerable, and some reports have linked the groups to gender-based violence, including sexual assault and forced marriage.55 There have also been reports of armed group leaders using more coercive tactics to recruit. In some camps, they have compiled lists of young men and told families they must contribute a male member to their ranks. “It’s not forced recruitment like last year, but it’s also not really voluntary”, explained a Bangladeshi researcher. “There is a lot of pressure”.56 Humanitarian workers said armed group members had in some cases told refugees their food rations would be cut if they did not attend recruitment meetings – even if depriving people of supplies in that way is likely impossible. In May, armed groups began to formally recruit in some camps, creating teams of majhis, teachers, imams, former administrators and businesspeople to urge refugees to sign up, adding to the risks of coercion.57 Some young men are now living outside the camps to avoid recruitment.58 Regardless of their views on existing armed groups, all interviewees said they thought that some sort of force was needed to fight for the Rohingya’s rights in Rakhine State. Their views are driven by a combination of desperation and anger at the Arakan Army for its alleged human rights violations in 2024. “I didn’t understand the need for an armed group before, but now I realise we definitely need one”, said a 50 See, for example, “‘I May Be Killed Any Moment’: Killings, Abductions, Torture and Other Serious Violations by Rohingya Militant Groups in Bangladesh”, Fortify Rights, March 2025. 51 Crisis Group interview, Rohingya refugee from Camp 19, February 2025. 52 Crisis Group interview, Rohingya refugee from Camp 11, February 2025. 53 Crisis Group interview, Rohingya refugee from Camp 10, February 2025. 54 Crisis Group interview, Rohingya refugee from Camp 1E, February 2025. 55 Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya refugees, February-March 2025. See also “Protection Sector Flash Update #2”, Protection Sector Cox’s Bazar, 21 May 2025; and “Gendered Violence and Insecurity in Rohingya Refugee Camps in Bangladesh – New Insights and Ways Forward”, XCEPT, January 2025. 56 Crisis Group interview, Bangladeshi researcher, March 2025. 57 Crisis Group interview, Rohingya refugee, May 2025. 58 “Protection Sector Flash Update #2”, Protection Sector Cox’s Bazar, 21 May 2025.