Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 Page 8 have accumulated a sufficient stockpile of weapons given to them by the Myanmar military.41 To build their legitimacy, the groups have framed the conflict in religious terms and worked closely with Rohingya religious leaders. Throughout November and December, they organised large public meetings in the camps, with 500 or more attendees.42 These gatherings culminated on 25 December, with a “unity” rally organised by Dil Mohammed that was attended by tens of thousands of camp residents, mainly madrassa students and their teachers.43 Representatives from all four armed groups gave speeches; some, including Dil Mohammed, leaned heavily into religious language, describing the fighting in Rakhine as a “jihad” against the “kafir” or non-believer.44 The crowd reportedly met these remarks with cheering. Since the start of 2025, the meetings have been smaller but more regular.45 Armed groups have worked together with Dil Mohammed, who has formed a civil society group, the Rohingya Committee for Peace and Repatriation, and opened an office in Camp 1E.46 Religious leaders and Rohingya camp officials known as majhis – all of them men – have been enlisted to strengthen the campaign. “Many people have been motivated to join the fight after hearing these words. The Rohingya religious leaders fully support the armed groups”, an 18-year-old male refugee told Crisis Group.47 Other Rohingya interviewees acknowledged that young men were joining in large numbers, sometimes with the encouragement of their families. “They are joining voluntarily, saying, ‘It’s up to us to secure our rights’”, said a 48-year-old woman. “If I were a man, I would join as well”.48 Some humanitarian agency officials monitoring recruitment say the number may be as high as 3,000 to 4,000.49 The conflict may have taken a dangerous turn. While Rohingya armed groups have dominated the refugee camps for years, support for the groups among refugees has tended to be low. Complaints about armed group members perpetrating abuses in 41 Crisis Group interview, source with knowledge of the matter, March 2025. Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya refugees and humanitarian agency officials, February and March 2025. 43 Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya refugees, February 2025. See also “Rohingya’s unity: A historic turning point”, Rohingya Khobor, 25 December 2024. 44 “Rohingya armed groups and the struggle for Arakan”, Rohingya Refugee News, 4 January 2025. 45 Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya refugees and humanitarian agency officials, February and March 2025. 46 The civil society group may be intended to give cover to recruitment activities. Publicly, Dil Mohammed is now urging “patience” and for Rohingya to “embrace peace”, a marked contrast from his firebrand statements at rallies in late 2024. “We don’t need to fight with anyone”, he insisted in a voice message on the committee’s Facebook page in March 2025. But he continues to organise private recruitment meetings, at which Rohingya are told they need to return to Rakhine and fight the Arakan Army. Crisis Group interviews, humanitarian agency officials and Rohingya refugees, May 2025. See also “Official Statement from the Rohingya Committee for Peace and Repatriation”, 22 March 2025. 47 Crisis Group interview, Rohingya refugee from Camp 22, February 2025. 48 Rohingya armed groups do not have women in their ranks, reflecting conservative views about women’s roles in Rohingya society. Crisis Group interview, Rohingya refugee from Camp 13, February 2025. 49 Crisis Group interview, humanitarian agency official, March 2025. 42