country. However, the NLD’s cautious attitude towards the Ma Ba Tha appears to indicate its understanding of the resonance of the Ma Ba Tha’s populist anti-Muslim message, and its recognition of the Ma Ba Tha as a significant political player. The Ma Ba Tha has been relatively careful to not directly target the NLD, although it has regularly strayed very close to the line. Many of the Ma Ba Tha’s attacks have sought to paint the NLD as proMuslim, and have also targeted Aung San Suu Kyi herself. For example, a statement by the Central Committee under Ashin Tiloka’s name in September 2015 urged people “not to vote dollar-paid politicians and those people who have been given several awards and titles by non-Buddhist foreign countries to destroy our country and religion” in a fairly obvious reference to Aung San Suu Kyi, as seen on a social media post.353 Similarly, Wirathu explained in a local interview why he was calling the NLD’s mascot of Khuddaung [“Fighting Peacock”] a Muddaung [“Muslim Peacock”], claiming that, “When the Rakhine incident broke out, (I found that) Daw Aung Saun Suu Kyi was not reliable […] And also in many towns, the persons in charge in NLD offices are Muslims.”354 Online, where there is a stronger degree of plausible deniability, Ma Ba Tha’s supporters were much more outright in their hostility towards the NLD. One of the most common ‘viral’ images that regularly circulates in pro-Ma Ba Tha forums is an edited picture of Aung San Suu Kyi in a hijab that even Aung San Suu Kyi acknowledged as a political liability.355 She complained that, “They took a photograph, cut out the monks and put the photograph on the Internet and said I was paying obeisance to the Muslims. And what was worse was, when I went to the Mon state recently, they Image 38: An anti-Aung San Suu Kyi graphic distributed this photograph to make the Monks think that I with the text, “Hajji Daw Su and her hardcore was pro-Muslim or anti-Buddhist.”356 Additionally, various followers” circulating the Internet social media posters are often openly derogatory of Aung San Suu Kyi, labeling her a foreigner and Muslim sympathizer,357 while others disseminate pieces of misinformation that misrepresent or discredit her positions and leadership. A prominent example came in September 2015, when an email allegedly written by Aung San Suu Kyi was “leaked” and circulated on the Internet. The email, which was addressed to a Rohingya rights activist in the U.K., claimed that the NLD would support and focus on the equality and rights of Rohingyas if they won the November elections.358 The email was widely disseminated through pro-Ma Ba Tha social media channels, even though Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD quickly moved to deny its authenticity.359 Nonetheless, the NLD showed itself through much of 2015 to be wary and even outright nervous of the Ma Ba Tha’s power. In addition to selecting not a single Muslim360 among the 1,151 candidates361 it fielded for elections, the NLD has, on various occasions, chosen to pander to, rather than confront, the Ma Ba Tha. One of the most prominent examples came in September 2015 after the Ma Ba Tha released a statement condemning U Tin Oo, the NLD patriarch, who had accused the Ma Ba Tha of obstructing the NLD’s election campaigns.362 The aftermath was instructive. Instead of pushing back, Oo, an 88-year old well-respected former political prisoner, visited Sitagu Sayadaw and Wirathu to smooth over the rift.363 Available footage on Youtube of the visit to Wirathu’s monastery at Masoyein in early October shows an awkward encounter with Oo being condescendingly lectured by Wirathu without speaking back.364 The NLD’s landslide victory has meant a catastrophic defeat for Ma Ba Tha Central Committee preferred candidates across the political spectrum. However, it remains to be seen if the election will result in any material change in the government’s policy towards the Ma Ba Tha, and towards ‘race and 37