Conclusion Back to contents 78 In particular, we hope that this work facilitates civil society and academic scrutiny about the process and nature of technology procurement within Myanmar’s smart cities. Possible topics can include: 1. Further research into the process and nature of technology procurement within Myanmar’s smart cities to find avenues for getting involved in shaping the process. 2. Further research on the critical gaps in information outlined in this report, specifically: a. What is the extent of the current CCTV use in Myanmar? b. What are the technical specifications of CCTVs currently being procured? c. Which government departments are responsible for the procurement, maintenance, use, and oversight of CCTVs? d. How do Myanmar’s safe and smart city projects overlap? e. Does this overlap (or lack of) have any implications for funding, control, and use? 3. Documenting evidence of harm, or instances of arbitrary use of state power arising from the use of these systems. It is apparent now, more than ever, that such technology has become a state tool to oppress pro-democracy movements under the newly formed military regime, with the junta tracking and cracking down on activists. Given the secrecy of the government and the institutions wielding the power to use such technology to watch over the people, it is difficult to prove the extent, underlying structure, or inner workings of the system. Our research shows that there are several information gaps in Myanmar CCTV networks at this time, especially as their use causes real harm to real people. The continuity with and heightening of prior repressive practices merit some attention and closer analysis, particularly of the technologies that facilitate this continuation.