A3: ချိတဆ ် က်မ1[င . ့် ဆက်သယ ွ ်မ1ကိ& ကန်သ & ျားအား ့ တ်ရန် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များြဖင့် အစိ&းရသည် အင်တာနက် အေြခခံအေဆာက်အအံမ ၀ မ.တ် နည်းပညာပိ&ငး် ဆိင & ်ရာ သိမဟ& & ့ တ် ဥပေဒနည်းများြဖင့် ထိန်း ချ$ပ်မ1ကိ& ကျင့သ ် းံ& ပါသလား။ (၀-၆ မ.တ)် A3: Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? (0–6 points) Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 due to the military’s repeated shutdown of internet services nationwide, as well as months-long blocking of social media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. Before the February 2021 coup, the government had generally refrained from restricting connectivity across the country, despite implementing one of the world’s longest internet shutdowns in Rakhine and Chin States beginning in 2019. Since the coup, military authorities have repeatedly shut down internet services nationwide. The military began disrupting the internet shortly before the coup, starting in the early morning hours of February 1, 2021. At 8 a.m., all mobile data and some fixed-line internet access were cut off nationwide.34 The military’s first internet shutdown after the coup ended later that day, but was followed by a near-total shutdown at 10 a.m. on February 6 that lasted 30 hours.35 Military authorities then implemented nightly shutdowns affecting fixed-line (fiber-optic and cable) connectivity on February 15, lasting from 1 a.m. to 9 a.m., until reports that access had been restored began to surface on April 28.36 Although the internet was on during the day in this period, users reported frequent short-term outages and slow speeds nationwide. On March 15, the military shut down all mobile data connections, which continued through the end of the coverage period,37 leaving only wireless broadband services and fixed-line services working during the daytime.38 On March 18, the military shut down public Wi-Fi connections.39 On April 1, the military ordered providers to shut down wireless broadband internet services indefinitely. Daytime fixed-line service, which is used by between 0.5 and 5 percent of users, was consequently the only way to access the internet.40 Months-long blocks on various social media platforms were ordered by the military in a bid to further control the flow of online information surrounding the coup (see B1). The military began listing some 1,200 0 approved internet services on May 25, which included a number of the previously blocked platforms.41 Before implementing the national shutdowns, the military briefly ended one of the world’s longest internet disruptions at the subnational level. On February 2, 3G and 4G mobile access was restored to 1.4 million people in Rakhine and Chin States.42 The government in June 2019 had cut off mobile internet service in these areas—where the military has conducted crackdowns over the past several years, first against the Rohingya and more recently against the Rakhine ethnic group—in order to “maintain the stability and law and order.”43 The government had pledged to restore access when the security situation improved,44 and a presidential spokesperson had said that the government would “fulfill every request made by” Myanmar’s military with regard to the shutdown in the two states.45 The government had restored limited 2G access in August 2020. The MoTC directed the internet shutdowns, apparently under orders from the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA).46 In the first few days after the coup, one telecommunications company documented the existence of the directives, which cited “fake news” and the need to protect national stability.47 The company stopped documenting the directives it received,48 however, reportedly due to license-related pressure from the MoTC (see B3). There were already reports that the MoTC had been pressuring telecommunications companies prior to the coup,49 and these reports have increased since.50 The MoTC has significant powers to cut off the internet without oversight or safeguards, as it controls much of the telecommunications infrastructure via the stateowned company Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT). Private-sector providers were gradually diversifying ownership of mobile infrastructure and the internet backbone. Myanmar has three underwater and four overland internet gateways.51 Because experts projected that bandwidth demand would grow 70 percent annually in the near Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) and Freedom House - Freedom of the Net: Myanmar - အင်တာနက်ေပ*တွင် လွတ်လပ်မ/ - ြမန်မာ2ိ4င်ငံ - Page 6