C5: အင်တာနက် လ&ပ် ေဆာင်မ1များအား အစိ&း ရမ. ေစာင့်8ကည့်ြခင်းသည် သံ&းစွဲသမ = ျား၏ ပ&ဂqိ$လ်ဆင ိ& ်ရာလွတလ ် ပ်မ1[င . ့် ၁ မ.တ် အချက်အ လက်လံ&ြခံ$မ1 အခွငအ ့် ေရး (privacy)ကိ& ချိ$းေဖာက်ပါသလား။ (၀-၆ မ.တ)် C5: Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? (0–6 points) Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to new evidence that authorities have obtained surveillance technology such as data extraction tools, as well as problematic legal changes including the suspension of limited privacy safeguards under the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens and an amendment to the Electronic Transactions Law that increased government access to personal data. State surveillance grew more pervasive during the coverage period. Despite the fact that Article 357 of the constitution included protection for private communications, government surveillance was a serious concern prior to the coup. After it seized power, the military circulated a draft cybercrimes law that would place all private data under its unchecked control.291 The draft law requires service providers to store private data on servers designated by the military, and to make them accessible to military interception without any form of oversight (see C6).292 Although the draft has not yet been enacted, the military unilaterally amended the Electronic Transactions Law in February 2021 by adding some of the same problematic provisions included in the draft.293 For instance, the revised law grants the authorities broad powers to inspect any device on vague bases such as “misuse.”294 The military has also effectively suspended some of the limited privacy protections afforded in the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, including its modest safeguards against warrantless surveillance and interception of private messages.295 Recent reports have confirmed the growing scope of the state’s surveillance efforts. A Reuters article from May 2021 described how former military officials had pressured providers in late 2020 to install interception technology that would enable the military to view texts and emails, listen to phone calls, and locate users without assistance or approval.296 New evidence of government purchases of hacking and extraction technology came to light in March 2021, when budget files obtained by Justice for Myanmar exposed acquisitions amounting to tens of millions of 1 dollars since 2018, including tools from vendors based in Canada, the United States, Sweden, and Israel.297 These included MacQuisition forensic software, which can extract data from Apple computers; MSAB Field units, which can extract even deleted content from mobile devices; and additional technology that has enabled security forces to determine the home addresses of online critics using their posts and the locations of their internet connections. Earlier reports from 2018 indicated that the government had spent $4.8 million on surveillance technology,298 which it allocated to the Social Media Monitoring Team (SMMT),299 a body established under the MoTC following requests from the parliament in February of that year.300 The government refused to reveal from which country the equipment was purchased, citing security concerns.301 One telecommunications company had warned that the government was creating a framework for direct interception of user data without proper safeguards.302 The NLD-led government argued that the SMMT was necessary to counter individuals causing “instability” online, including through hate speech and defamation.303 Public statements by senior government officials in May 2018 specified that the SMMT’s mandate focused narrowly on foreigners and foreign organizations suspected of causing unrest and threatening the country’s sovereignty through interference.304 Analysts have suggested that, given Myanmar’s broader political context, the SMMT was established to surveil foreign activists (including activists from Myanmar who operate outside the country or lack citizenship), foreign media outlets, and international organizations that focus on the Rohingya crisis and conflicts involving other ethnic minority groups in Myanmar, as well as the International Criminal Court and other international institutions pushing for accountability for the atrocities against the Rohingya. The SMMT was widely criticized by civil society organizations.305 Little is known about the body’s operations or whether there is any oversight.306 Civil society activists suspect that the SMMT is now Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) and Freedom House - Freedom of the Net: Myanmar - အင်တာနက်ေပ*တွင် လွတ်လပ်မ/ - ြမန်မာ2ိ4င်ငံ - Page 23