4.2 Technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) as tactic for digital repression Women have historically played a pivotal and highly visible role in Myanmar’s political and civic life, from grassroots activism to leadership in pro-democracy movements. Since the 2021 coup, however, women’s rights have faced a severe backslide amid an environment of escalating violence. Between February 2021 and December 2024, the Women’s League of Burma documented the killings of 1,344 women and the arrest of 5,027 as a result of the junta’s violence.55 The UN Secretary-General, in his 2023 report to the Security Council, noted that sexual violence, including the threat and use of rape, has been used in Myanmar “as part of the repertoire of political violence to intimidate and punish opponents, their family members, and women human rights defenders.”56 This backsliding of women’s rights is also evident in resistance-controlled areas. Several WHRDs reported retaliatory attacks from members of the revolutionary forces for exposing cases of domestic violence, with accusations of “undermining the revolution” used to silence them (KII-4). Similar threats targeted women’s rights organisers who challenged male-only public panels, forcing them to undertake security risks assessments for their events (KII-10). Within this wider context of violence, women’s participation in Myanmar’s digital sphere has faced a significant challenge due to targeted online abuse and digital repression. According to research jointly released by Sisters to Sisters and Myanmar Witness, “online abuse of Myanmar women who are actively involved in politics was at least five times more prevalent at the end of 2022 compared with the weeks following the coup.”57 The research also highlighted that the “overall prevalence of abusive posts targeting women on Telegram was up to 500 times higher than international baselines for abuse prevalence on social media, where these exist.” Moreover, it stated that “90% of abusive posts in its qualitative analysis were authored or shared by pro-SAC accounts.” It said that “many targeted women were not well-known, and appear singled out simply for positively commenting on pro-People Defence Forces (PDF) or National Union Government (NUG) posts.” Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net report 2024 also found that women activists who opposed the coup suffered sexual harassment.58 The report highlighted specific online tactics, such as doxxing on platforms like Telegram, Facebook and TikTok. Echoing the report by Sisters to Sisters and Myanmar Witness, Freedom House noted that this abuse did not only target politically active women: “Women and girls self-censored on a range of 55 https://www.womenofburma.org/sites/default/files/2025-05/Databased%20for%20Violence%20Against%20Women%20 by%20Year.pdf 56 Andrews, T. (2024). Courage amid crisis: gendered impacts of the coup and the pursuit of gender equality in Myanmar. https:// www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session56/a-hrc-56-crp-8.pdf 57 Myanmar Witness. (2023, 27 January). Digital Battlegrounds: Politically motivated abuse of Myanmar women online. Centre for Information Resilience. https://www.info-res.org/cir/reports/digital-battlegrounds-politically-motivated-abuse-of-myanmar-women-online/ 58 Freedom House. (2024). Freedom on the Net 2024: The Struggle for Trust Online. https://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-10/FREEDOM-ON-THE-NET-2024-DIGITAL-BOOKLET.pdf 18