AI-enhanced ground surveillance While implementing the large-scale data collection process is important for mass surveillance, the junta has also deployed ground surveillance technology. In 2022, closedcircuit television (CCTV) networks equipped with AI facial recognition capabilities were deployed in cities including Mawlamyine, Dawei, Taunggyi, Hpa-An and Myitkyina.35 One activist interviewed described how her group was targeted: After an activity, the junta forces tracked their vehicle number through CCTV footage. It was at the time of the crackdown. They tracked the vehicle using its licence plate to find out who owned it and who had rented it. From there, they made connections. If the car was rented, there would surely be a phone number. That’s how they got the phone number. Finally, they intercepted phone calls and monitored exactly who was talking to whom and how the meetings were arranged. Members of our group experienced arrests as a result of that surveillance. (KII-8) Financial surveillance through mobile money It was found that the junta also surveilled financial transactions. Its financial surveillance system extended to monitoring mobile money transactions, evident from the freezing of user accounts on mobile money services.36 Financial transactions on mobile money platforms, which require account registration primarily through mobile phone numbers, are vulnerable to surveillance as they can be easily linked to the personal data of citizens collected by the junta. A WHRD working on gender-based violence described how financial surveillance is being used to target activists: “One of the members of my organisation, her personal KPay37 account accepts the funding for the activities. They tracked her through her KPay account and came to arrest her at home.” (KII-4) Online monitoring by pro-junta groups, and doxxing as digital warfare While the junta has implemented a surveillance system using advanced technology, pro-junta groups monitor online social media activity identifying individuals for attack. This is a form of non-state surveillance that should be considered part of the overall surveillance mechanism supporting the coup. Forms of attack have include sharing the private information of individuals, such as addresses and phone numbers – or doxxing – on pro-junta channels,38 which Myanmar Witness describes as the digital manifestation of the real-world violence faced by thousands of people in Myanmar every day. Social media users have been detained as a result of incitement on Telegram channels run by pro-junta groups.39 35 Potkin, F. (2022, 10 July). Myanmar’s junta rolls out Chinese camera surveillance systems in more cities. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-myanmars-junta-rolls-out-chinese-camera-surveillance-systems-more-2022-07-10/ 36 https://burma.irrawaddy.com/news/2022/09/21/254726.html 37 KPay is a short form of KBZ Pay, a mobile wallet, powered by KBZ bank, Myanmar’s privately owned bank. 38 Anlezark, D. (2023, 17 October). Myanmar’s growing doxxing problem. Index on Censorship. https://www.indexoncensorship. org/2023/10/myanmars-growing-doxxing-problem/ 39 https://www.myanmarinternet.info/my/post/surveillance_ecosystem_over_four_years 14