in conflict-affected areas or those controlled by the resistance. Notably, on 15 February 2021 nightly internet blackouts – referred to as “internet curfews” – were imposed from midnight to 9 a.m.,27 restricting communication during critical hours of coordination. The junta has also targeted social media platforms. Widely used platforms including Facebook, Twitter and Instagram were first blocked right after the coup, on 4 and 5 February 2021.28 In response, activists have turned to virtual private networks (VPNs) to bypass restrictions and access the platforms. However, on 30 May 2024, the SAC attempted to restrict the use of VPNs by employing advanced technologies.29 This included advanced firewall systems and network intelligence tools, with capabilities such as deep packet inspection (DPI) to analyse user data.30 According to a Justice For Myanmar report, the project to block VPNs was awarded to Mascots Technologies, with technical support from Chinese companies Geedge Networks and the China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC).31 3.3 Expanding surveillance mechanisms Several forms of surveillance are critical to the ecosystem of digital repression that has been established in Myanmar. Data collection and biometric surveillance The junta first strengthened its surveillance capabilities by enforcing mandatory SIM card re-registrations in order to track people’s communications.32 In 2023, the Ministry of Immigration and Population, under the junta’s directive, also pushed to collect the biometric and biographic data of citizens.33 This has included fingerprint and iris scans and recording detailed personal information such as current address, occupation and family status. It was also announced that the data from the SIM Registration Management System, shared by the Posts and Telecommunications Department, would be cross-checked against the database of the Ministry of Immigration and Population.34 By combining data collected from SIM registration with biometric and biographic data, the junta is able to easily monitor the public’s movements within the country, and have the biographical details of any person they are monitoring ready at hand. 27 Al Jazeera. (2021, 16 February). Myanmar blocks internet for second night in bid to choke protests. Al Jazeera. https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/16/myanmar-blocks-internet-for-second-night-in-bid-to-choke-protests 28 Reuters. (2021, 7 April). Myanmar’s internet suppression. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/MYANMAR-POLITICS/INTERNET-RESTRICTION/rlgpdbreepo/ 29 Access Now. (2024, 26 June). Worse than China or Iran? Myanmar’s dangerous VPN ban. https://www.accessnow.org/ myanmar-vpn-ban/ 30 https://www.facebook.com/100067770862498/posts/781584470777241/?mibextid=oFDknk&rdid=h2JblHnIaw2jTEBP 31 Justice For Myanmar. (2024, 19 June). The Myanmar junta’s partners in digital surveillance and censorship. https://www. justiceformyanmar.org/stories/the-myanmar-juntas-partners-in-digital-surveillance-and-censorship 32 https://www.moi.gov.mm/index.php/news/34298 33 https://dop.gov.mm/en/news/2454 34 Ibid. 13