Human Rights Declaration also adds public safety and the vague and open-ended “general welfare of peoples in a democratic society” as legitimate aims for the restriction of freedom of speech. While restrictions are indeed permissible, they must meet tests of permissibility: they must be outlined by law, necessary and proportionate to protect a legitimate aim. These are the conditions laid down in the UDHR and the ICCPR. The test of legality requires that the restriction set by any government on the right to freedom of expression be expressly laid out in a law. This legislation, order or bylaw must be publicly available and understandable by the public, and no restriction is valid unless it has the backing of the law.20 The law must be both accessible and foreseeable.21 Not only must the restriction be based in law, it must also be legitimate. The test of legitimacy requires that the restriction on freedom of expression be based on one of the justifications laid out in Article 19(3).22 What are these justifications? Article 19(3) states that “protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals” and “respect of the rights or reputations of others” constitute legitimate reasons for the restriction of freedom of expression. Any restriction – and indeed, criminalisation – of expression that does not fall in with these justifications is liable to be contested as falling foul of Article 19, ICCPR. Finally, the test of necessity and proportionality requires that the restriction be based on a “pressing social need” which makes the restriction “necessary in a democratic society.”23 It must be placed so as to fulfil the aims set forth in Article 19, paragraph 3, ICCPR. Of course, the state has a margin of appreciation in testing the necessity of the restriction, but the margin is narrow where freedom of expression is considered.24 In determining pressing social need, the test of pluralism, broadmindedness and tolerance is to be applied,25 which accommodates divergent views and opinions. Not only this, but the restriction placed by the state on freedom of expression must be proportional – i.e., the least onerous restriction must be applied to appropriately meet the need.26 A broad restriction is unacceptable, and the restriction must be narrowly tailored. For instance, the incidence of internet shutdowns across the world, where access to the internet is completely cut off in response to any situation (primarily, states use the excuse of security) is disproportional to the aims of the restriction,27 and so would be contested under Article 19, paragraph 3. 20 Hinczewski v. Poland, No. 34907/05, § 34, ECHR 2010 (ECHR). 21 Keun-Tae Kim v. Republic of Korea, Communication no. 574/1994 CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994 (4 January 1999) (HRC); Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (no. 2), Judgment of 26 November 1991, no. 13166/87, Series A no. 216 (ECHR); Article 19 v. Eritrea, (2007) AHRLR 73 (ACHPR 2007). 22 Vladimir Petrovich Laptsevich v. Belarus, Communication no. 780/1997, § 8.5, UN Doc. CCPR/C/68/D/780/1997 (2000) (HRC); Vladimir Velichkin v. Belarus, Communication no. 1022/2001, § 7.3, UN Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1022/2001 (2005) (HRC). 23 Jacobs, F. C., & White, R. C. A. (1996). The European Convention on Human Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Handyside v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24 (ECHR); Vogt v. Germany (no. 1), Judgment of 26 September 1995, Series A no. 323 (ECHR); Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, (1984) (Inter-Am. Ct.); Prince v. South Africa, 2004 AHRLR 105 (ACHPR 2004). 24 Lehideux & Isorni v. France, no. 22662/94, ECHR 1998-VII (ECHR); Schwabe v. Austria, Judgment of 28 August 1992, Series A no. 242B (ECHR). 25 Handyside v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24 (ECHR); Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (no. 1), Judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30 (ECHR); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom Judgment of 23 September 1981, Series A no. 45 (ECHR). 26 The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of Health, ex parte Fedesa and others, [1990] ECR I-4023 (ECJ); Klass v. Germany, Judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28 (ECHR); Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, §§ 33-5, 54, Advisory Opinion 5/85 (1985) (Inter-Am. Ct.); Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart; Reno v. ACLU 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (US Sup. Ct.); Human Rights Committee. (2011). Op. cit., at para. 34: "[…] must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their protective function." 27 Kaye, D. (2017). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. A/HRC/35/22. https://undocs.org/A/HRC/35/22. International standards / 21