Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield Crisis Group Asia Report N°314, 18 May 2021 Page 18 nectivity is, large protests took place in several towns in Mandalay and Sagaing regions on 24 March, with demonstrators apparently unaware that activists had declared a “silent strike” urging the public to stay indoors that day.82 The regime’s phased shutdown of the internet has been complemented by some even cruder methods to restrict information flows, internet access and social media use. Since late February, numerous reports have emerged of security forces stopping and searching civilians’ mobile devices, looking for social media content or VPNs, in what seems to be an attempt to scare people off the platforms.83 When security forces enter an area, they now routinely disable or destroy privately owned CCTV cameras, which have been a source of evidence of regime abuses, often shared on social media. Before launching a violent crackdown in Yangon’s South Dagon in late March, security forces even disabled all internet services in the township.84 More recently, in rural areas, local administrators have ordered residents to take down satellite dishes from a Thai company, PSI, that broadcasts banned media outlets Mizzima and DVB.85 Since early March, the military has also ramped up arrests of regime opponents with a high-profile social media presence for spreading “fake news” and “threaten[ing] the public on the social media”. The new Penal Code provision, Article 505-A, has been used widely to charge high-profile opponents of the coup, as well as at least ten journalists detained while covering street protests. For most of April, the military announced charges under this article against twenty people each day on national television. The link between the charge and their online activity was made explicit in the televised public announcements, which included their name, home address and Facebook URL.86 The list includes not only celebrities, activists and journalists, but also seemingly ordinary social media users. This tactic seemed designed to instil fear, so that people would not criticise the military or support the opposition movement on social media. Many of those listed have since been arrested and are facing three years in prison. Since the coup, the regime has used the police force’s social media monitoring team to track celebrities and social influencers who were posting anti-military statements on social media. At the end of March, shortly before the 505-A charges were announced, the team received instructions to begin finding the addresses of targeted social media users. One officer said the team had no technology to match Facebook users with physical addresses and relied instead on informants (known as dalan in Burmese) and data from the General Administration Department. Regarding the charges against ordinary users, the team member explained that some of those fac82 Crisis Group interviews, journalist and social media researcher, March 2021. See, for example, Facebook posts on protests in the towns of Kume, Wuntho and Katha on 24 March 2021. 83 See, for example, “Police search phone records of detainees in Myitkyina”, Radio Free Asia, 9 March 2021 (Burmese); and “In Mandalay city, security forces inspect motorcycles and cars”, Mizzima, 5 April 2021 (Burmese). 84 Crisis Group interview, journalist who covered the crackdown, April 2021. The same tactic was reportedly used in the town of Kalay in Sagaing Region in early April. 85 The Myanmar military banned five media outlets on 8 March: 7Day, Myanmar Now, Khit Thit Media, Mizzima and DVB. See also “Myanmar junta limits internet, seized satellite dishes”, The Associated Press, 9 April 2021. 86 The nightly announcements commenced on 2 April and stopped from 24 April.