Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield Crisis Group Asia Report N°314, 18 May 2021 Page 16 the ministry of transport and communications urged a more moderate approach.71 The regime quietly shelved the draft and instead enacted amendments to the Electronic Transactions Law on 15 February. These included some sections of the draft Cyber Security Law but minus the requirement to store data inside the country.72 Around the same time, the regime also pursued legal changes that seemed designed to deter online criticism. On 14 February, it announced amendments to the colonialera Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, including the addition of a new charge, commonly known as Article 505-A, that carries a three-year prison term for “causing fear”, “spreading false news” or “agitating directly or indirectly” to commit a criminal offence against a government employee.73 The regime has since used this law extensively against a wide range of opponents, including journalists, politicians, activists, striking doctors and social media users (see Section IV.B below). Additionally, from the early hours of 15 February, the military began instituting a nightly internet shutdown that has continued ever since. Initially enforced from 1am to 9am, the blackout was later relaxed to 1am to 6:30am on weekdays, following lobbying by businesspeople.74 There has been significant speculation as to why the military chose to cut the internet at night, when most internet users are asleep. It seems to have been driven by two factors. The first is that shutting down the internet at night has less impact on the economy and government operations. The second is that it stopped livestreams of night-time raids by security forces, which had caused public outrage and even hindered police operations as in some cases members of the public had rallied to the support of those being arrested, forcing the outnumbered police to back off.75 B. Falling Back on Blunt Tools In spite of these somewhat flailing efforts to curtail online activity, social media continued to play an important role in building opposition to the regime. It helped sustain the civil disobedience movement by enabling it to foster solidarity and mobilise public support for striking workers, while activists used Facebook and other platforms to organise themed protests, such as the “22222 uprising” on 22 February that saw millions march across the country. As security forces began to employ lethal force more readily from late February, social media platforms also became important for documenting violence against protesters. Soon, livestreams, videos and photos of the dead and wounded began to flood social media, along with footage of security forces 71 Crisis Group interview, digital rights advocate, March 2021. Crisis Group interviews, Yangon-based businesspeople, February and March 2021. This requirement would have been unworkable for companies and, most likely, unenforceable for the regime. It may, however, have resulted in some technology companies – such as cloud storage providers – no longer offering services in Myanmar. For analysis and a translation of the amendments, see the Free Expression Myanmar website. 73 “State Administration Council Law No (5/2021), Law Amending the Penal Code” and “State Administration Council Law No (6/2021), Law Amending the Code of Criminal Procedure”. English versions are available in the 15 February 2021 issue of the Global New Light of Myanmar. 74 For full details, see the NetBlocks website or Twitter feed. After more than 70 nights, these restrictions were lifted from 28 April. 75 Crisis Group interviews, March 2021. See also Crisis Group Briefing, The Cost of the Coup: Myanmar Edges Toward State Collapse, op. cit. 72