Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield Crisis Group Asia Report N°314, 18 May 2021 Page 14 IV. The Post-coup Technology War Since the first hours of the coup on 1 February, the Tatmadaw’s actions have reflected a keen awareness of the importance of the internet, social media and communications technology for consolidating control. In an effort to gain the upper hand over its opponents, it has grappled with a range of approaches – from legal amendments and filtering websites to complete internet shutdowns. But given how connected Myanmar citizens have become, and how united they are in opposing military rule, the internet is a battlefield on which the Tatmadaw will struggle to win. It poses significant risks for the regime, for example by enabling the public to organise rallies and document abuses. As a result, the generals have turned to the bluntest of censorship instruments to stifle opposition – an approach it initially avoided due to the economic consequences, but also because it sought to project an image of business as usual to domestic and international audiences. At the time of writing, the country was in a near-total internet blackout, with online access limited to fibre optic connections where available. A. Targeted Measures Fail The difficulties the military would face in controlling online activity were apparent from the first hours of the coup. One of the junta’s first actions after detaining members of the civilian government in the early hours of 1 February was to send soldiers into the offices of the mobile operators and internet service providers to force them to switch off all phone and internet connections, plunging the country into a communications blackout.63 The blackout had the desired effect of stopping the flow of information about fast-unfolding events, but it also immediately highlighted constraints that the Tatmadaw had never faced in the past, including when it shut down the internet for weeks after the 2007 protests.64 This time, the internet outage triggered chaos for businesses, forcing manufacturers to close their factories and shutting down the banking system entirely. By the early afternoon of 1 February, the military had no choice but to restore all internet access. With the internet back on but people initially hesitant to venture into the streets, social media was the natural place for opposition to the coup to germinate. On 2 February, medical workers used Facebook to launch a civil disobedience movement, refusing to work for the regime and calling for the reinstatement of the democratically elected government.65 The ministry of transport and communications – one of the few ministries in the military regime led by a serving officer, Admiral Tin Aung San – responded by ordering mobile operators and service providers to block access to social media platforms, beginning with Facebook on 3 February and followed by Twitter and Instagram two days later. As the first street protests against the regime gath- 63 “A digital firewall in Myanmar, built with guns and wire cutters”, The New York Times, 23 February 2021. 64 “Pulling the Plug: A Technical Review of the Internet Shutdown in Burma”, OpenNet Initiative, 29 September 2007. 65 “After coup, medical workers spearhead civil disobedience campaign”, Frontier Myanmar, 2 February 2021.