Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield Crisis Group Asia Report N°314, 18 May 2021 Page 22 obedience movement and the CRPH. Interestingly, it even quickly gave the CRPH a blue tick to verify its identity and described it as a “government organisation”. The Tatmadaw’s experience across other social media platforms has been mixed. As it became harder for the military and their proxies to maintain a presence on Facebook, they increasingly began using YouTube to host videos that could then be shared by users on the more popular platform.103 The video hosting platform has far less capacity to monitor Myanmar-language content than Facebook, and in the past has been slower to act on dangerous content, such as disinformation.104 But it is increasingly mirroring Facebook’s policies in terms of account removal, and since 1 February has banned five accounts linked to the military, including those of TV channels MRTV and Myawady, as well as some accounts that push pro-military propaganda.105 YouTube’s parent company, Google, has also disabled some military accounts on Gmail, the Play Store and Blogger, including a mirror site for the Tatmadaw Information Team.106 TikTok was initially slower to act, with some warning that Tatmadaw soldiers’ use of the service, and the platform’s inadequate response, had echoes of Facebook’s missteps prior to the wake-up call created by the Rohingya crisis. Of particular concern were videos from ordinary soldiers brandishing their weapons and threatening protesters, some of which had been viewed millions of times.107 Misinformation and military propaganda were also prevalent; as with YouTube, the increased use of the video clip sharing platform by military personnel and supporters seems to have been partly driven by stricter moderation on Facebook. But in contrast to the Russian platform VK, which also has a heavy Tatmadaw presence but is otherwise not popular in Myanmar, TikTok has millions of ordinary Myanmar users. Many of them took to TikTok in the wake of the coup to express their support for protests and their anger at the military, and like Facebook and other platforms it saw a significant spike in engagement until the mobile data shutdown.108 After the videos of soldiers threatening protesters came to light, TikTok took steps to clean up its platform, issuing new guidance to its content moderators. It has also expanded partnerships with local organisations to improve its understanding of Myanmar. It has, however, stopped short of banning the Tatmadaw; company representatives say they instead review content on a case-by-case basis, and point out the Tatmadaw does not have an official presence on TikTok.109 Some social media researchers have expressed concern at this policy on the basis that individual soldiers posting videos may be doing so with the endorsement of superiors or even as part of a coordinated campaign. Since the Rohingya crisis, the Tatmadaw has in103 One prominent example was a video from an account named MMLeak that accused the NLD government of being beholden to foreign interests. The video surfaced shortly before the 2020 election and continues to reappear periodically on YouTube. 104 Crisis Group interviews, social media researchers, November 2020 and March 2021. 105 “YouTube bans Myanmar military channels as violence rises”, The New York Times, 5 March 2021. In mid-April, YouTube removed Myanmar-American News, a pro-military disinformation account that had tens of thousands of followers. 106 The page is no longer accessible. 107 “TikTok on alert after it becomes outlet for Myanmar soldiers”, Financial Times, 4 March 2021. 108 Crisis Group interview, TikTok representative, May 2021. 109 Crisis Group interview, TikTok representative, May 2021.